Olympiodorus #2: On First Alcibiades

Olympiodorus on First Alcibiades (transl. Griffin 2014 & 2016)

(Where I have changed the text from Griffin, I have used [[double square brackets.]])

I had some troubles with the notes I took on this book, but don't have the patience to go through it again from the start, so I would appreciate pointers to relevant passages on the gods, on myth, or on ritual that I missed.

From the Life of Plato: "the power that the sacred images (agalmata) [of the gods] have among the Greeks, animals have among the Egyptians, by representing each of the gods to whom they are dedicated."

From the Life of Plato: "Since [Plato] wished to encounter the Magi as well, but was unable to reach them because of the war being joined in Persia at that juncture, he arrived in Phoenicia, and upon encountering the local Magi, acquired the skill of the Magi. And this is why in the Timaeus he is plainly experienced in the skill of sacrifice, discussing the [prognostic] signs of the liver and [other] entrails and other matters like this."

(In other words, Olympiodorus takes the magi to be the originators of sacrificial and divinatory methods generally, rather than merely of disreputable "magic".)

The Role of the Dialogue

From Lecture 2: "one should consider that this dialogue is similar to the fore-gates [of temples], and just as those [fore-gates] lead on to the [[adyton]], so one should liken the Alcibiades to the fore-gates, and the Parmenides to the [[adyton]]."

(The adyton is the innermost part of a temple, often accessible only to the priests.)

Socrates' Methods

From Lecture 2: "The [section] of midwifery [124A–135D] is the one in which Socrates, through a line of questioning appropriate to [Alcibiades’] nature, makes Alcibiades prove that the human being is the soul, so that he himself is his own teacher: here, then, is the [Platonic] doctrine (dogma) that the answerer is the speaker. For this is the sort of person that Socrates is, acting as midwife to souls for the birth of ideas (logoi): which is also why they say that he is the son of Phainarete, who was a midwife (maia) – like Hermes [the son of Maia]."

(Logios is a common epithet of Hermes, so he is suitably associated with the birth of logoi.)

Divinely-inspired Lover and Crude Lover

From Lecture 3: "The first difference is that the crude lover wonders at his beloved (ta paidika), whereas the divinely inspired lover is the object of [his beloved’s] wonder. And [Socrates] illustrates this in the words, ‘Son of Clinias, I think that you are wondering . . .’ – that is, ‘at me’."

From Lecture 3: And the third difference is that the divinely inspired lover is present (sunesti) with his beloved in a godlike way (theoeidôs), that is, without physical presence: for just as the radiance of the divine (to theion) is present in every place, yet its essence (ousia) is in no place (since it is not confined in place), the divinely inspired lover is present in a way that imitates this same mode [of presence]. But the crude lover is present with his beloved [only] when he wants to engage in acts (energein) at the level of bodily sensation, at the lowest level [of sensation] at that, namely, touch. He has made this clear in his statement, ‘Since the others mobbed you, but I didn’t say a word over so many years’ [103A], showing that he is absent insofar as he is silent, but present insofar as he follows and loves [Alcibiades].

(Sunesti, "is present with", can also mean "has sex with".)

Wonder and Philosophy

From Lecture 3: "Are wondering . . . The phrase is suitable to the target (skopos) [of the dialogue], as wonder is ‘the beginning of philosophy’. For once we wonder ‘that it is’, we move on to ‘why it is (dioti)’: and this is [what it is to do] philosophy, to express the causes (aitiai) of things – assuming that philosophy is the knowledge of beings (onta) insofar as they exist. And [this is so] in another way too – for Iris [‘Rainbow’] is philosophy since she speaks about beings, and the poets tell the tale that she is the daughter of Wonder. And Iris herself causes wonder when she appears in the air; [namely] wonder at how a mathematical shape, the circle, emerges in such material [as air]."

(The idea that wonder is the beginning of philosophy, and the phrase "beings insofar as they exist" are both from Aristotle. Iris is introduced here because she is the daughter of Thaumas, and the Greek word for "wonder" is thauma.)

Love, Divine and Human

From Lecture 4: "Socrates is making two points here, one of which is human, the other divine. Naturally it is human to be in love, since this is common to all human beings: but it is divine to love without being [physically] present (aparousiastôs erân). He presents the cause of the second [kind of love] first, when he says that it is a god or a daimon."

Real and Apparent Goods

From Lecture 4: "And it is plain to everyone to see, that you do not lie: Here he secretly refutes Alcibiades, and does not praise him (which is what he appears to do). For just as the good in the god cannot be articulated in words, likewise the good in us participates in something beyond articulation. And if now he says, concerning [the good that is] present to Alcibiades, that it is ‘clear to everyone to see’, it is plain that this is a base thing and not truly ‘good’, so that even in these [words] there is a refutation."

From Lecture 5: And the pleasure-lover longs for divine ease, about which it has been said, ‘the gods who live at ease’ – that is the kind of idea that this person has in mind, but since he is unable to attain it, he fights over shadows (skiamakhein), the reflections and expressions of this [higher idea]. And the money-lover longs for fulfilment and self-sufficiency, because self-sufficiency and fulfilment are divine – and so he desires this; but since he is unable to attain [the real thing], he grasps after it by loving money. And again, the reputation-lover longs for the god who is sufficient and freely giving, even if he is unable to attain this.

Socrates Imagines a God Asking Alcibiades:

"Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you would choose death." (transl. Benjamin Jowett)

From Lecture 5: "Well, then, he made a god pose the questions for three reasons: [1] first, in order that the young man might not deny his own words, since we have all learned to trust that the divine is aware of even our chance movements, if indeed it is true that

All things are full of god, and he hears all things, right through rocks and

through the earth and within a man himself, who has concealed his thought (noêma) in his breast.

[2] The second explanation would be that Socrates staged this scene because of his fondness for tragedy. Certainly [Socrates] is keen on this kind of thing: hence, just as the [tragedians] often produce a ‘god from the machine’ (mêkhanê) to resolve disasters (as in the Alcestis of Euripides, the playwright put Apollo in the house of Admetus), so Socrates similarly introduced a god in this case.

[3] According to a third explanation, it is because Socrates, who is a lover, wants to bring himself into union with his beloved, both as a consequence of his compassion [for him], and because the divine is a unity (henas) beyond being; meanwhile, he wants to fulfil his beloved according to his judgement (krisis), and the divine also acts for fulfilment (teleiôtikos). And he made himself answer for Alcibiades, since the interval (meson) between god and Alcibiades was wide, and it would have been empty."

From Lecture 5: "we should notice that, although he is just one actor ‘on stage’ ( en heni prosôpôi ), he preserves the form of dialogue here, himself introducing the questions as if they came from a god, and the answers as if they came from Alcibiades."

How Humans Imagine the Gods

From Lecture 5: "imagination is always available to our soul, as our soul is constantly fashioning impressions (tupous) of what it does not know, and bestowing shapes, sizes, and bodies on the non-bodily, and confining [even] the god in terms of place (topôi)."

The Self

From Lecture 5: That selfsame (autos) god . . . It was fitting for him to locate ‘self ’ (autos) on the level of the god, since the god is the unit (henas), and unitary in form (henoeides). But he spoke in the plural about the realities (pragmata) that Alcibiades is questing after, because the [entities] that follow and extend from the divine and the monad are many, and every person quests for these. That he spoke in the plural about these is clear also from his introducing [the phrase], ‘to add something to the realities (pragmata) that are there’.

Does Socrates Boast?

From Lecture 6: Now first of all, we raise the puzzle (aporoumen), why is Socrates boastful here? – he who is everywhere ironic, and about whom it is said, ‘this is your habitual irony, Socrates’; who is always claiming that he knows nothing, and teaches nothing, which is also why the god at Delphi said about him that Socrates is wisest of all men’ – since it was not only by striking the air, by vocal expression, that [Socrates] used to say this sort of thing, but [he also expressed himself] through his manner of living, and in his divine inspiration. We ought to investigate, then, how it could be that such a person thinks [of himself] like this in the present case, announcing that he alone is able to deliver power to the youth.

Well, we reply, first, that the philosopher boasts at the right moment (kairos): for before this, it was crucial that he not boast, since Alcibiades scorned him just as he scorned his other lovers. So Socrates understood the right moment for boasting. In fact, he has oft en done this: for example, in the Theaetetus, after establishing himself as a judge between ‘genuine’ and ‘wind-egg’ theories (logoi), he says, ‘For no god ever has ill-will toward a human being, nor do I do this out of any ill will, but it is never lawful (themis) for me either to agree to falsehood or to suppress truth.’ (Notice how he ranked himself with the god here, by saying, ‘For no god ever has ill-will . . . ’) And again in the Apology he boasts when he says, ‘It is not permissible (themis) for a better person to be ruled by a worse one’; and again in the same dialogue when he says that ‘Anytus and Meletus have the power to kill me, but not to do me any harm at all’ (in the first part of this sentence, he uses the word ‘me’ in the more ordinary way, referring to the composite (sunamphoteron) [of soul and body]; but in the second part, he uses it in its strict sense (kuriôs), referring to the soul alone).

So that is one solution [to the puzzle], that he knows how to be boastful at the right moment. A second solution is that he is not [really] being boastful (megalorrhêmonei) when he prefers himself to base people with a herd mentality (agelaioi). For it is nothing to boast about (mega) when the philosopher achieves what worthless people lacked the power to achieve. And here is a third [solution]: for someone who pays precise attention (akribôs ennoêsêi) to the words used here, it does not seem as if Socrates is boastful at all. For he says, ‘with the god’s support, of course’ [105E], and ‘It is impossible to put any of these plans (dianoêmata) of yours into eff ect without me’ [105D]. (The word ‘without’ is a material (hulikos) preposition, and suitable to matter (hulê), since ‘without’ matter there is nothing here [sc. in the perceptible world] to think about). 348

From Lecture 6: For this is also what Athena did in the case of Pandarus: when he wanted to break his oath, she conceded [this] to him, which is also why he received corrective punishment (kolazomenos) through his tongue, since this became the instrument of his oath-breaking.

(In the Iliad, Athena convinces Pandarus to shoot at Menelaus, breaking a truce that had been agreed upon between Greeks and Trojans. Then, with Athena's help, the Greek Diomedes kills him with a spear that pierces his tongue. This had been generally understood as a fitting punishment for Pandarus' breaking his word - or rather that of the Trojans in general. As Olympiodorus describes it, Athena arranges the entire affair to punish Pandarus' willingness to break the treaty.)

Which God is 'Friendship'?

From Lecture 9: "The phrase ‘my friend’ (ô phile) isn’t included here by accident, but because (as we have often remarked) Socratic exhortations and refutations are like medicines drenched in honey. But he expects to aggravate the youth on account of his ignorance about justice, and drive him to distraction, and so he conciliates him fi rst by calling him ‘friend’, and again a little later by swearing ‘the [god of] Friendship, mine and yours’ [109D].

Now at this point, they [sc. the commentators] investigate which god he calls ‘Friendship’. Some of them say it’s Love (Erôs), but this is incorrect. For ‘friends are dear to their friends’, but in this case Socrates is in love with the youth, while the youth does not love Socrates in return: that occurs only at the end of the dialogue, where Alcibiades’ reciprocal love (anterôs) is given over. Whom, then, does he call [the god of] ‘Friendship’? Well, we say that it is Zeus, since he befits both [Socrates and Alcibiades], on account of his function as a ruler (arkhikos). First, Zeus befits Socrates because Socrates is a philosopher – for philosophy is the leader of all the other skills. Also, as the Stoics have it, the person who understands how to rule is the ruler, even if he does not exercise that power, and philosophers are such people: that is also why Socrates says in the Phaedrus , ‘and I am with Zeus’. Second, Zeus befits Alcibiades because he loves rule and leadership in battle. So the words ‘. . . mine and yours’ are not trivial. Rather, it is fitting for these [words] to have been said in the sequel; for here Socrates says, ‘have you failed to notice that you do not know justice’ (and ‘failure to notice’ is kin to ignorance, for both mean the absence of understanding), ‘or did I fail to notice that you learned’, instead of ‘how were you likely to escape my notice, when I follow you around like [the] conscience that is present for each of our actions?’"

Why Are Few Souls Excellent?

From Lecture 10: "When you give the credit to ‘ordinary people’, you’re falling back on teachers who lack competence: The saying of the Seven Sages hints at the same point: The more, the worse. Now we investigate how, if the natural occurs more frequently than the unnatural (for all human beings are, by nature, five-fingered, and this occurs more frequently, but [some] are unnaturally six-fingered, and this is rarer) – how, then, if the natural occurs more often than the unnatural, can ‘more’ be described as ‘bad’? Well, we reply as follows: just as it’s no surprise to us when most people dwelling in a plague-spot fall ill, but we’re surprised when a few remain healthy, so too in this case we ought to suppose that souls, after they descend here, fall sick rather than remaining healthy because they are dwelling in an alien country (anoikeios), and this is why most of them are in bad shape (kakoi). For our father, and our true country, lie above alone."

Affirmative and Negative Oaths

From Lecture 10: Socrates… Since the word ‘not’ (ma) is negative, while the word ‘yes’ (nai) is affirmative, he [normally] ought to have said ‘not by Zeus’ (ma Dia); but he cancelled the positive force of the ‘yes’ in ‘yes by Zeus’ nonetheless by adding ‘far from it’, which stands in for ‘by no means’ (oudamôs), which itself is clearly negative.

Soul, Intellect, and God in Human Life

From Lecture 11: "Alcibiades fell short of three primary hypostases, Intellect (nous), God (theos), and Soul (psukhê). [1] [He fell short] of Soul, first, since he lacks knowledge (ouk oiden), and understanding (gignôskein) is a distinctive feature of Soul. [2] He fell short of Intellect since while he lacks knowledge, he supposes he has it; for it is a distinctive feature of Intellect to revert [upon oneself] (epistrephein). (That's because Intellect is analogous to a sphere, as it makes each point both origin and limit). [3] [And he fell short] of God because he is producing harmful results (kakopoios): for he is on the verge of giving advice about what he doesn't know, so that he may bring those who take his advice to harm; but God is characterised by goodness."

From Lecture 12: "But in what sense does Plato mean all this, namely, that everything just is advantageous, and everything advantageous just, and that they are mutually convertible? [[...]] Well, if we adopt Proclus' rule, then loftier [beings] do not end or begin at the same ponit as hollower [beings]: rather, their progression extends further, like three archers of unequal power, and the stronger archers fire a great distance. And the advantageous corresponds to the Good (agathon), but the noble (kalon) to the Intellect (because beauty is the foam and flower of Form (eidos), and Form corresponds to Intellect as it reverts to its source; and that’s because what is partless reverts upon itself, since partition arises on account of matter (hulê), because all the formulae (logoi) exist in a partless way in the seed – such that when a part is cast away, the remainder still fulfils its needed task), and justice begins from Soul (for justice is in the [non-rational soul] too, [for example] among the storks)."

On Divination

From Lecture 12: the person inclined to [[divination]] (mantikos), like the naturally talented person, hazards well-aimed guesses about the future. [[...]] And [Socrates] didn’t say ‘you’re a [[diviner]] (mantis)’, since the [[diviner]] is knowledgeable, while the [[person inclined to divination]] is unfulfilled [in the mastery of their talent]: just as the doctor (iatros) and the medically inclined person (iatrikos) are not the same. And Alcibiades didn’t make this statement with knowledge, but he offered his prediction based on opinion (doxa).

Nobility and Advantage

From Lecture 13: "(as [Alcibiades] claims) a noble act can be a bad one: for instance, when going to war on behalf of one's country, and dying for a friend (philos) - this action is noble because it's praiseworthy (for it's done for a friend), but it's not good, inasmuch as it brings no benefit to the body. And the converse holds of the shameful and the good, as in the case of refusing to give one's life for a friend.

Now the [[(Delphic)]] Oracle made both of these points very clear. On the topic of refusing to give one's life for a friend, on the one hand, [she] said this:

You did not defend your friend, though you were at his side as he was dying:

You arrive impure: depart from my all-beautiful shrine.

On the other hand, when it came to a man who thrust out his arm to help his friend, but his spear struck [his friend by accident], she said this:

You reached out to save your companion: the blood does not pollute you,

but you are purer of slaughter than you were before."

Lecture 13: "Next, since he is conversing not in the Socratic manner, but as a teacher, and thus he is overstepping the instruction of the god, according to which ‘the god made me a midwife [of ideas], but prevents me from begetting’ [Tht. 150C] (for now he is teaching these lessons, rather than acting as a midwife, since [for midwifery] we would need to hear these statements from Alcibiades, not asserted by Socrates), and since he was a midwife’s son, he reverses the arrangement, and makes Alcibiades the respondent by asking these same questions of Alcibiades.

[...] He changes the structure of the argument to midwifery, to avoid overstepping the injunction of the god"

Again on Falling Short of The Hypostases

From Lecture 14: "And the person who is in this condition [of double ignorance] has fallen short of Soul (psukhê) and Intellect (nous) and God (theos). First, due to his double lack of knowledge, he has fallen short of Soul, since understanding (gnôsis) is congenial to the soul; and due to his being in a ‘most shameful’ condition, he has fallen short of Intellect, since he is unable to revert to himself, which is distinctive of mind, and also because the noble or beautiful (kalon) is congenial to Intellect, and thus in becoming ‘most shameful’ he has fallen short of it; and he has fallen short of God in ‘producing the most harm’ and ‘deserving reproach’, since simplicity is congenial to God, and wellness (to eu) also derives from simplicity. (For [the adverb] ‘well’ is a designation of simplicity, which is why we call simple ways [of acting] ‘well-intentioned’ (euêtheis))."

From Lecture 14: "it is by being most deserving of reproach that [Alcibiades] falls short of God, and thereby (hôs) of being blessed; for the word ‘blessed’ was used of a person untouched by the doom of death, which is also why ‘reproachable’ is opposed to ‘blessed’ in the line [from Euripides, Orestes 4]: That blessed man – and I do not reproach his fortunes…

From Lecture 14: "I swear by the gods: [[...]] And the timing of his oath is not without significance; in fact, it shows that he is [now] in a speechless state. (Consider, why did he not swear earlier?) That is also why, when Socrates criticises him, he calls him ‘friend’; another reason is that [Alcibiades] climbed up one rung [on the ladder of knowledge]: for he stepped from double ignorance into the intermediate condition between simple and double [ignorance]."

From Lecture 14: "That is, it fell short of the good because it was deserving of reproach. For reproachability is contrary to blessedness, and blessedness is appropriate to the gods, for whom the doom of death does not exist."

The "Olympian" Statesman

From Lecture 14: "And he has deployed quite a few examples that are appropriate to this purpose, by saying ‘if someone asked you if you had the ability to ascend to heaven…’ [117B]; and there’s a sense in which this was appropriate to Alcibiades, on account of Pericles, who used to be called ‘Olympian’. Thus the line went about him, He hurled the lightning, he thundered, he cast Greece into turmoil…"

Matter and the First Cause are Beyond Language

From Lecture 15: "Granted, the first cause is also beyond language, but that is as beyond form: matter, on the other hand, is beyond language because it is inferior to all form."

Confiscations of Pagans' Property

From Lecture 15: "You can also see from this that Plato was the first [philosophical teacher] to make a point of refusing fees, since he was Zeno’s contemporary, and Zeno did take fees. But why does philosophy alone not demand fees, although other skills do? Perhaps it is because no other skilled craftsmen claim to make their pupils good people, but only to make them skilled – as doctors produce doctors, and the carpenter produces carpenters. But the philosopher claims to make people good, and in so doing, he hopes not to be treated unfairly by them. Perhaps Plato made a point of refusing fees thanks to his own wealth; that is also why to this day the school’s endowment (diadokhika) is preserved, despite the many confiscations that are taking place."

Methods of Purification

From Lecture 16: "You also have here the Platonic doctrine, that whereas Aristotle wants Intellect to be the first principle, Plato wants the Good [to be the first principle], since intellect lacks the capacity to give a share of itself to a lie, but the good gives a share of itself even to a lie, for there is such a thing as a good lie: likewise here, [we have] the notion of taking something untrue as true for the sake of the good. But lying is not intellectual (noeros), as the good is. Since there are five methods of purification, these five have been transmitted by Plato in the present dialogue. For it is possible to be purified [as follows]:

[1] By escaping into sacred precincts, or to teachers, or by studying books that one encounters; and he has conveyed this method by saying, ‘But, my blessed friend, trust in me and in the Delphic inscription, “Know Thyself”’ [124A].

[2] Second, by forceful correction (epiplêxis), which he conveyed when he used the method of rebuking [Alcibiades], criticising his cognitive [part] for double ignorance, and his vital part and explaining with tragic flair the consequences of double ignorance, how [harmful] they are.

[3] Third is the Pythagorean [method], which is also perilous, since it causes one to take a taste of the passions ‘with the tip of the finger’ – which the doctors employ as well, making use of what is ‘a little worse’: and he has conveyed this [method] here by saying that ‘You have something in you fitted for ruling the city, your natural leading portion (hêgemonikon), if you find yourself willing to adorn this with education’; for he exalted his reputation-loving nature this way.

[4] Fourth is the Aristotelian [method], which heals one harm by another (kakôi to kakon iômenos), bringing the battle of the opposites into a harmony; and he has conveyed this here by at one point using an accusation to castigate Alcibiades, and at another time rousing him up to the height with encouragement, causing him to produce the definition of civic knowledge.

[5] Fifth is the most efficacious [method], the Socratic, which uses a procedure of transformation (metabasis) from similarity; and he uses this here, when he says ‘You long for power? Learnwhat is true power, which cannot be taken away by a tyrant. You long for pleasure? Learn what is true leisure, which is observed even among the gods’."

The Great King of the Persians

From Lecture 17: That’s because it was their custom for the eldest to rule; naturally, then, the Persians and all Asia sacrifice to him and pour libations as soon [as he is born], honouring him as a god (since before Alexander, all Asia was ruled by the Persians). But when Alcibiades was born, not even his neighbours were aware of it.

From Lecture 17: "Alternatively, we might say that perhaps Darius was an Achaemenid, if not as a grandson, still by an indirect line; that is, even if he was not, as the poet says,

[Their own] son, and grandson of Zeus who gathers the clouds;

– but still a daughter’s son, or related in some other way, since there would perhaps have been no argument over the kingship, if he were not descended from Zeus."

Perseus and Heracles

From Lecture 17: "The line of Heracles and Achaemenes [go right back to Perseus, son of Zeus]: For Perseus was born of Zeus and Danaë; and Achaemenes from Perseus and Andromeda, and Alcaeus and Electryon were born from other women; and from Alcaeus and Amphitryon, Electryon and Alcmene; and from Amphitryon and Alcmene, Heracles. Hence Heracles is sprung from Zeus on either side, for he clearly possessed much of Zeus' character and vitality from both his father's side and his mother's side; at any rate, the story goes that in a single night he made love to fifty women, and every one of them had a child by him.

Now the philosopher Proclus here raises the puzzle why, when [Socrates] could prove that the Lacedaemonians also trace their lineage to Zeus by way of Heracles, he does not do this, but he presents them as deriving from Perseus [instead]. And he resolves [the puzzle] himself, saying that [Plato] probably honoured [Perseus] before [Heracles] because he was winged: for both men were born to purify [the world] of evils, and especially Heracles; hence Pisander describes him as 'an utterly just destroyer', since he performed a great many slaughters for purification. But Perseus was also such a person, and he also had [the advantage of] being winged, as the comedy showed, and the Gorgon and the sickle."

(Olympiodorus does not show how this genealogy can be interpreted; there is no reason to think that he does not believe in Heracles' reality, yet Zeus being his father seems like a problematic idea from a Neoplatonic view.)

The Worship of the Persians

From Lecture 17: "from the very start, the newborn [king] grants a full display to all his subjects. That's why all of them immediately conduct a sacrifice [[at his birth]], then honour the king's birthday each and every year, because the Persians honour what is heavenly, and most of all in the heavens the Sun; and this is also why they celebrate the king's birthday every year, because the Sun is the symbol of the year. For [the year] is called 'annual' (eniautos) because it generates the Sun in itself (en heautôi poiôn).

From Lecture 17: "And [[Socrates]] says that the man who teaches wisdom [[(to the Persian king)]] 'teaches him the Magi's art', but to prevent anyone that by 'the Magi's art' (mageia) he means spells (manganeia) and sorcery (goêteia), he adds 'which is the cultivation (therapeia) of the gods'. For the Persians honoured (as we have said) what is in the heavens, whom [Socrates] calls 'gods' (theoi) because [heaven] 'always runs' (aei thein). For he does not mean the 'sorcery' that Demosthenes ascribes to Aeschines' mother: for this man was a mendicant priest of [[the goddess Meter]] (mêtr-agurtês).

(Agurtia is much the same as manganeia and goêteia, whether in relation to Meter or otherwise.)

A Presocratic "Theologian" Still Read in the 6th Century

From Lecture 18: "Pherecydes, the teacher of Pythagoras, whose book on theology is preserved"

Know Thyself

From Lecture 18: And he calls [Alcibiades] ‘blessed’ (makarion) because he is about to link him to the gods; and in this context, [the word] ‘blessedness’ (makariotês) is used for the negation of ‘fatedness’ (kêr), since [the prefix] ma– indicates negation. And he positions himself before the god because he is the proximate cause of Alcibiades’ salvation. By using the phrase ‘Know Thyself’ (gnôthi seauton), he reveals the content of [the god’s] command (prostattomenon), since he used the [words of the] instruction to reveal what [the god] commanded: [1] he used the word ‘know’ (gnôthi) [to show] that we are not a body (sôma) (for [a body] does not have knowledge), nor a combination [of body and soul] (for this does not have knowledge either, insofar as it is a combination, since it certainly doesn’t have knowledge as a body), but [instead] we are a soul (psukhê), and not a vegetative soul (for that has no knowledge); and [2] he used the word ‘thyself’ (seauton) since [we are] also not non-rational (alogos) (for the non-rational [soul] does not revert upon itself), but [rather] rational, and not always completely rational, but sometimes even ignorant. That’s also the reason why he added the [imperative] command ‘know’ (gnôthi): for no one commands the agent to act, but now [sc. in Alcibiades’ condition of ignorance], he commands him to know himself."

From Lecture 19: "why is Socrates ignorant of himself? [...] 'self-knowledge' is said in many ways (pollakhôs): it is possible to know oneself with respect to one's external [possessions]; and of course it is possible to know oneself with respect to one's body; and it is possible to know oneself as a civic or social persion (politikôs), when one knows oneself in the tripartition of one's soul; and it is possible to know oneself as a purificatory person (kathartikôs), when one knows oneself in the act of liberation from the affections (pathê); and it is possible to know oneself as a contemplative person (theôrêtikôs), when a person contemplates himself as liberated (heauton... theasêtai); it is possible to know oneself theologically (theologikôs), when a person knows himself according to his paradigmatic Form (idea); and it is possible to know oneself as an inspired person (enthousiastikôs), when a person knows himself as a unity (kata to hen) and, thus bonded to his proper god (oikeios theos), acts with inspiration (enthousiâi). Now Socrates did not know himself as an inspired person"

(Olympiodorus is here using the degrees of virtues as originated by Plotinus and Porphyry - political/civic, purificatory, theoretical [~Soul], paradigmatic [~Intellect]. For Olympiodorus, the 'theological' - which we might translate as 'metaphysical' - corresponds to the level of the Intellect. Corresponding to the level of the One, there is divine inspiration; that he uses this word, rather than hieratic ('priestly'), which had been commonly used for the highest grade of virtues since Iamblichus, might reflect a less exalted view of ritual. Compared to Proclus, who is more concerned with the efficacy of ritual practice, Olympiodorus consistently speaks about symbolic meanings.)

The Gap Between Medicine and Divine Intervention

From Lecture 20: "What, then? Is it possible for blindness to become absent thanks to human ingenuity? For that belongs to divine radiance. [The explanation is] that it’s possible to use the name ‘blindness’ for the condition that is caused by cataracts."

Friendship at All Levels of Being, from Henosis to Kinship

From Lecture 20: "But Alcibiades ought to have considered that [the word] ‘friendship’ (philia) is said in many ways. For there is friendship in respect to the One (hen), which is also called ‘union’ (henôsis), and this arises in [episodes of] inspiration (enthousiasmois) [that derive] from the One and [unite us] with what is better (pros to kreitton). And there is friendship in respect to mind (nous), which is called ‘agreement’ (homonoia). And there is [friendship] in respect to thought (dianoia), which is called ‘thinking alike’ (homophrosunê); that’s also [the meaning of] the phrase ‘in my sharp-witted thoughts’ (en phresi peukalimêisi). And [there is] friendship in respect to opinion, which is called ‘[ holding] the same opinion’ (homodoxia). And there is [friendship] in respect to habits of character (êthesin), which [is called] ‘shared feeling’ (homoiopatheia); that’s also the [meaning of the phrase] ‘comrade delights comrade’, by shared feeling, for children delight each other and so do youths and the elderly, by enjoying [ having] the same feelings and experiences (pathê). And there is another [form of] friendship, which belongs to descent (kata ta genê), which is called ‘kinship’."

More on 'Know Thyself'. Philosophy as Universal Knowledge

From Lecture 23: A philosopher "discovers that [the soul] is a representation in every shape (pammorphon agalma) of all beings, and through one thing he knows all beings, and does not toil over the knowledge (gnôsis) of the rest: such a person knows the principle of the just, which is in [the soul]: and since (as [[Plato]] makes clear in the Gorgias) someone who knows just things is [himself] just, someone who knows the soul will thereby be just. And it was appropriate (kalôs) that before the temple of Apollo at Delphi all that was inscribed was ‘Know Thyself’, since the one who knows himself knows all beings, and the knowledge of all beings belongs to the [[diviner]]."

From Lecture 23: "That is, ‘Was it some lightweight person, the one of the seven sages who inscribed this on the shrine of the prophetic god?’ But it was Chilon of Lacedaemon. Often I think, Socrates, that it was for anybody: Self-knowledge seemed to Alcibiades sometimes to be easy, other times to be extremely difficult, because of the tragic [verse] that says

To know yourself in words is nothing great; but in deed, only Zeus of all the gods knows [how to do it].

So [it struck Alcibiades] as a minor thing in name, but challenging in action."

Each God Is Complete, and All Are in Each

From Lecture 27: "but [all of the excellences] are present in courage in a courageous way (andreiôs), and in another [excellence] in a self-controlled way, just as all the gods are present in Zeus in a Zeusian way, but in another [god] in a Heraean way, for no god is incomplete. And as Anaxagoras used to say, ‘all are in all, but [in each] one abounds’: we’ll say the same about the divine beings. For every excellence is practical wisdom, since it has an understanding of practical actions (prakta); and every [excellence] is courage, since it engages in a struggle (agônizesthai); and every [excellence] is self-control, since it leads [us] to what is better; and every [excellence is justice], since it measures out which actions are right and proper. And among the civic excellences, each one has its own distinctive subject-matter (hupokeimenon idion), but all those [excellences] beyond these [civic ones] are one and the same in their definition (logos)."

On the Story of Odysseus and Circe

From Lecture 27: "what Hermes is for Odysseus, Socrates becomes for Alcibiades: when [Alcibiades] is about to approach the people (corresponding to Circe), he gives him the antidote (pharmakon alexêtêrion) called ‘moly’; and he provides it lest [Alcibiades] be transformed into a wild beast by the people. And the medicine is this: not to observe (theasasthai) the entire people all together at once (holon homou), but to carefully examine (skopêsai) the [constituent parts] from which the people develop."

From Lecture 27: "And [Socrates] calls the medicine not ‘moly’, but ‘stripping off’: for he strips the multiplicity (plêthos) from [Alcibiades], like multiple tunics. Similarly, Homer’s Odysseus did not observe everything at once, but ‘looked at each one with his eyes’. Also, [the character] Circe - since we have mentioned her - references the overseer (ephoros) of sensory life; that is also why she is the daughter of Helios [the Sun], who is the leader of sensory things (aisthêta)."

From the Self to the Self Itself, from the Civic to the Inspired

From Lecture 27: Up to this point, the discussion has been about the 'self', and [Socrates] has taught about who the civic person is. From this point forward, he is also speaking about the 'self itself', that is, the purificatory and contemplative [person], and he says, 'Just as if the Pythian [god] told the pupil [of the eye] "See thyself"' (and the command is appropriate to the one commanded, since as the Sun is the source of light, so too vision, since it is sun-like, is analogous to the Sun), 'and that [organ] obeyed the commander, as an appropriate leader, and yet, thanks to its externally moved nature (heterokinêton) was unable to revert upon itself, it would surely look away to another [pupil] or to a mirror, form which it could observe itself; and likewise you, since you have utterly blinded what is self-moving in you and acted as something externally moved and lacking the capacity to revert upon yourself, now look into my soul, and know your own [soul] through it. And when you look away to my [soul], you will find therein 'divine images (theia agalmata)', Intellect (nous) and God (theos); and in virtue of Intellect you will act in a purificatory manner, whereas in virtue of God you will act in a contemplative manner. For God is in [the soul] by relation (kata skhesin), and we have the common conepts (koinai ennoiai) by the illumination of Intellect, and we have inspirations by the [illumination] of God'. For as a lover, [Socrates] did not want the young man to be led upward by him, but together with him. That is also why he wanted [Alcibiades] to be led upward by his own soul, and not to have his own power of self-movement (autokinêton) twisted."

The Good Person and the God

From Lecture 28: "the good person is loved by god (for the good and god are one and the same); the person loved by god knows the divine in himself; such a person knows himself, because he knows the highest [part] of his soul, and its flower; therefore, the statesman knows himself’."

From Lecture 28: "the good person is a ruler, because he links himself to god, who rules all; and the bad person is naturally a slave, because he links himself to matter, which is worst, and is ruled by all things."

The Divine and the Cosmos

From Lecture 28: "Timaeus conceptually distinguished the divine from the cosmos [Tim. 42E], so that he might gaze down upon the cosmos, which is the sort of thing that needs to be kept distinct from god; and Socrates separated power from philosophy, so that he might gaze down upon [power] as it is, the sort of thing that needs to be separated from the good person (spoudaios)."