Damascius on Hieratic #4: On the Philebus

Excerpts from the L. G. Westerink translation, more or less (in this case rather less) related to hieratic (ritual or "theurgy").

The "magic" of pleasure

§96. "... What else will then be left to decide that the Good is different from pleasure and to prevent pleasure from completely obscuring the Good by its magic (goêteiai)?"

False pleasures

§171. "To prove that there are false pleasures Socrates adduces a variety of arguments (1) [36e5-8] pleasures in dreams; as the visions that we see in our dreams are unreal, and in some cases even impossible, so the attendant pleasures are unreal and impossible; (2) [ibid.] the pleasures of lunatics who imagine things that they do not really see; some, in fact, have been known to be afraid for themselves because they thought they were earthenware objects; (3) [39c-40e] the pleasures roused by vain expectations: even people with a philosophical training are liable to these; they will sketch out ideal societies and delight in these fictions; (4) [40e-42c] comparison with greater pain; (5) [42c-44a] the fact that getting rid of pain is pleasant; (6) [37a-40e] the fact that they accompany false opinion."

Pure pleasures

§206. "Pure pleasures are those not preceded by any discomfort, for instance the sight of the evening star, or a view of a fine pasture; and in general, whenever the senses are in their normal condition and then receive some pleasant impression, one can evidently not maintain that such pleasure comes from previous discomfort. How can perception then be stimulated to seek replenishment, of which pleasure is the natural result? Surely when there is no previous deficiency there is no need of subsequent replenishment. The answer is that there is a deficiency, but it is imperceptible, and therefore there is no preceding discomfort.
It is better to put it like this: when the natural prevails, replenishment is afforded by something that is somehow of a higher order than the natural, and of this we are entitled to say that the organism has need, not because anything has been lost, but because it is not present."
§207. "Some pleasures are violent and passive, namely those that are coupled with pain [51a]; others are purely active, being observed in the animal when in a state of perfection and of activity [51e-52b]; in others, again, there is but little passivity [51b-e]."
§208. "Pure pleasures, too, belong partly to the body, as for example seeing light of suitable intensity; partly to the soul, such as the pleasure that goes with contemplation and with the perception of an intelligible reality; partly to the combination of the two, as the joy caused by health, in which reason also shares, or by a process that starts in the soul and descends to the body."

Knowledge

§225, of which the beginning is unfortunately lost, is a classification of knowledge. Among these, "cognition of unconditioned general ideas, which is primarily the field of dialectic", can be sub-divided into four classes; two are composite, two simple, which latter "may consist in direct rational contemplation of reality by 'pure reflexion', or it may, through illumination by the Light of Intelligence, have immediate intuition of reality."