Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.
I.81
Chares "proposes to make [grammar] cover all Greek language and every signification,--a thing which, if one may say so, is not feasible even for gods."
I.85
"That [grammar] should deal with [all forms of speech in the poets] is sheerly impossible, since in the poets there is discourse concerning the gods and concerning virtue and the soul, things wereof the Grammarians have no expert knowledge."
I.92
"... the 'historial' [part of grammatical science] is that wherein they give instruction regarding persons--divine persons (prosôpôn theiôn), for example, and human, and heroic,--or else explain about places, such as mountains or rivers, or record fictions (plasmatôn) or legends (mythôn), or anything else of that description."
I.176f
"There are two distinct kinds of 'hellenism' [Greek style]: one stands apart from our common usage and seems to proceed in accordance with grammatical analogy; the other conforms to the common usage of each of the Greeks and is derived from framing words and from observation in ordinary converse. For example, the man who froms from the nominate Ζεύς (Zeus) the oblique cases Ζεός (Zeos), Ζεΐ (Zei), Ζέα (Zea), frames the declension in accordance with the first kind of 'hellenism,' but he who simply says Ζηνός (Zênos), Ζηνί (Zêni), Ζῆνα (Zêna) frames it in accordance with the second, the one more usual with us."
I.182
"[S]ince some arts--such as statuary and painting--are really arts (technai), but others which are claimed as arts--such as astrology (Chaldaikê) and the art of the haruspex (thytikê)--are not wholly and truly arts, in order that we may learn whether the so-called art of 'hellenism' is merely a profession or a substantial power, it will be necessary for us to possess some criterion by which to test it."
I.248-269
"IS THE HISTORICAL PART [OF GRAMMAR] CONSISTENT?
(248f) Now it is evident that 'history' is regarded as entirely a division of the Art of Grammar. Tauriscus ... declares that of the critical art one part is literary, another practical, and another historical; ... that which treats of readiness in handling unarranged material is historical.
(250f) Dionysius the Thracian, in asserting that there are six parts of grammar, ... includes amongst them the historical; for he says that 'the parts of grammar are skilled reading acording to the scansion, explanation concerning the tropes which the poems contain, exposition of the phrases and histories, the discovery of etymologies, the reckoning of analogy, the judging of compositions,' ... the historical part [] consists of the exposition of phrases and histories.
(252f) And Asclepiades ... stating ... that the primary parts of grammar are three, the technical, the historical and the grammatical ..., subdivides the historical into three; for he says that 'of history one division is true, one false, one as if true: the factual (praktikên), that of fictions (plasmata) and legends (mythous) is false, and as if true are such forms as comedy and mimes.' And of true history, again, there are three parts: one sort is that about the persons (prosôpa) of gods and heroes and notable men, another about places and times, the third about actions. And of false history (that is, the legendary) there is, he says, one kind only, the genealogical. And he says, like Dionysius, that the section dealing with 'glosses' [rare or obsolete words] commonly comes under the head of the historical part. ...
(254) [T]he majority of [the grammarians] have agreed that it is non-technical and consists of unmethodical matter... if [grammar] is an art, since the parts of an art (technê) must certainly be technical, and it is agreed that the historical part is without method, the historical will not be a part of the Art of Grammar.
(255f) [The grammarian] cannot declare, on the ground of any scientific and general consideration, that the shoulder of Pelops, after it was devoured by Ares or by Demeter, was of ivory and that Heracles' head became bald as his hair fell off when he was swallowed by the sea-monster which was attacking Hesionê, but in order that he may record these events he must have met with all hte particular historians of these events. But to repeat all the particular events by meeting the particular historians is not a technical method. Therefore the historical part is not methodically derived by the Grammarians from any art.
(257) Moreover, since one kind of history deals with places, another with times, another with persons and another with actions, it is plain that if the exposition of places and times is not technical, neither will that of persons and actions be technical; ... But, in fact, there is nothing technical about recounting a 'history' of a place, as when we assert (shall we say?) that Brilesus, and Aracynthus too, is a mountain of Attica...
(258) Neither, then, will the making announcements about persons and actions be technical, as for instance that Plato the philosopher was first called Aristocles and that, when a youth, he had an ear pierced and wore an earring...
(259-262) For these stories and otherss like them, besides being perfectly useless, evince no technical faculty, so that the recital of histories too is void of art.--Furthermore, as we have shown above, there is no technical knowledge either of things infinite or thigns which vary from hour to hour. But particular histories are both infinite ... and without fixity, because the same facts are not recorded by all respecting the same person. For instance (for it is not out of place to use familiar and appropriate examples of the facts), the historians adopting a false assumption say that Asclepius, the founder of our science [=medicine], was struck by lightning, and not content with this falsehood they invent many variations of it,--Stesichorus saying in Eriphylê that it was because he had raised up some of the men who had fallen at Thebes,--Polyanthus of Cyrenê, in his work on the origin of the Asclepiades, that it was because he had cured the daughters of Proetus who had become mad owing to the wrath of Hera,--Panyasis, that it was owing to his raising up the dead body of Tyndareôs,--Staphylus, in his book about the Arcadians, that it was because he had healed Hippolytus when he was fleeing from Troezen, according to the reports handed down about him in the tragedies,--Phylarchus, in his ninth book, that it was because he restored their sight to the blinded sons of Phineus, as a favour to their mother Cleopatra, the daughter of Erechtheus,--Telesarchus in his Argolicum, that it was because he set himself to raise up Orion. Thus, of an assumption which begins with a falsehood and is so multiform that it cannot be checked, and changes its shape at each man's fancy, there can be no technical treatment.
(263-264) Moreover, since of the subjects of history one part is history, another legend, another fiction,--and of these history (historia) is the recording of certain things which are true and have happened, as that Alexander died at Babylon through having been poisoned by plotters; and fiction (plasma) is the narrating of things which are not real events but are similar to real events in the telling, such as the hypothetical situations in comedies and mimes; and legend (mythos) is the narrating of events which have never happened and are false, like the story that the speceis of venomous spiders and snakes were born alive of the blood of the Titans, and that Pegasus sprang from the head of the Gorgon when her throat was cut, and that the companions of Diomede were changed into sea-brids, Odysseus into a horse, and Hecuba into a dog,--
(265f) such then being the variety in histories, since there exists no art which deals with things false and unreal, and the legends and fictions, which form the main subjects of the historical part with which grammar is concerned, are false and unreal, it will follow that there exists no art which deals with the historical part of grammar. Hence they deserve to be laughed at who assert that even if the subject-matter of history lacks method, yet the judging of it will be a matter of art, by means of which we ascertain what is falsely related and what truly.
(267f) For, firstly, the Grammarians have not furnished us with a criterion of true history, so that we might determine when it is true and when false. In the next place, as the Grammarians have no history that is true, the criterion of truth is also non-existent; for when one man says that Odysseus was killed in ignorance by his son Telegonus, and another that he breathed his last when a sea-gull dropped on his head the spike of a roach, and yet another that he was transformed into a horse, surely it is a hard task to try to discover the truth in such incoherent accounts. For we must establish first which of these dissentient narrators is telling the truth, and then inquire as to the facts; but when all relate what is improbable and false no opening is given for a technical criterion."
I.274 (for the value of poetry)
"Moreover, it is evident that it is not only these things which have been happily expressed by the poets, but also notions about the gods (ta peri theôn), such as that expressed by Euripides in his Phrixus,--
Whoe'er of mortals, sinning day by day,
Deemeth the gods are blind to his misdeeds,
Thinks wrongly, and in thinking thus is caught
When Justice, haply has some leisure time.
But if these and similar sayings are useful, and are not apprehended without the Art of Grammar, then grammar too will be profitable for life.
I.287-292 (against the value of poetry)
"Furthermore, as regards what is said by Euripides about the gods, ordinary folk too hold the same opinion. For the sentencec—
Whoe’er of mortals, sinning day by day,is matched by the sentence commonly quoted—
Deemeth the gods are blind to his misdeeds,
thinks evil thoughts and thinking thus is caught
When Justice, haply, has some leisure time—
The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small;
for the difference is only in the metre. And if one investigates one will find that the sentiments of the poets are much worse than the notions of ordinary folk. Yet he who has been proclaimed the philosopher of the Stage seems still rather moderate when he says that he does not know to whom he is praying,—
Thou stay of earth, who hast on earth thy throne,
To see and know thee, who thou art, O Zeus,
Doth baffle wit! Art thou Necessity
Of Nature? Or mankind’s Intelligence?
Howbeit, I invoke thee.
But Homer and Hesiod, according to Xenophanes of Colophon,—
Tell full many a tale of the lawless deeds of immortals,
Thieving and wenching and dealing deceitfully one with another.
For Cronos, in whose time, they say, was the life of blessedness, castrated his father and swallowed his children; while Zeus, his son, after robbing him of his dominion,—
Under the earth he flung him and under the barren ocean,
Far away, under the earth where the pit of destruction is deepest.
But Zeus’ own brethren conspire against Zeus, and so he is helped by Thetis,—
Whenas the other Olympians all were wishful to bind him,
Hera along with Poseidon, with Pallas Athenê to aid them.
For he is most savage, and when he had hung up his sister and wife like a temple-robber, not satisfied with that he also reviles her, saying—
Hast thou already forgot how from heav’n thou didst hang, with two boulders
Tied to thy feet, and about thy hands a chain did I fasten
Gold-wrought, not to be broken, and thou wast suspended in heaven
High in the clouds; and the gods were enraged throughout lofty Olympus?
And in his rage he hurls Hephaestus out of heaven, and he—
Crashed in Lemnos, and little of life was remaining within him.
And he treats his brother with contempt, as—
Having for dwelling
Grim halls, dismal and dank, detested e’en by immortals.
And in addition to his ruthlessness he is given to incontinence, for on beholding Hera finely decked out on Ida he cannot bear waiting to retire to their appointed chamber, but flings himself to the ground on the mountain and rolls over with his wife,—
Grass, fresh grass, for their couch did the earth shoot forth ever kindly,
Hyacinths, too, with the crocus, and lotus besprinkled with dewdrops.
The varied nature of poetry being thus exposed, grammar becomes useless since it cannot show us which parts of it we should believe as being true, and which we should disbelieve as mythical falsehoods."
I.302-306
"Moreover, as [the grammarian] is blind in respect of these [philosophical] things, so he is also in respect of the poems written about them, as when Empedocles says,—
Hail ye, but I as a deathless god, no longer a mortal,And again,—
Walk in your midst and am honoured by all.
Why do I urge these things, as though it were some great matter
If I do far surpass all mortals doomed to destruction?
For the Grammarian and the ordinary man will suppose that the philosopher gave utterance to these sayings out of boastfulness and contempt for the rest of mankind,—a thing alien to one who is even moderately versed in philosophy, not to speak of a man of such eminence. But the man who sets out from physical investigation knows clearly that the dogma “like is known by like” is nothing but an old one which is thought to have come down from Pythagoras and is found also in Plato’s Timaeus; and it was stated much earlier by Empedocles himself,—
Verily earth by earth we behold, and water by water,
Aether divine by aether, and fire the destructive by fire,
Love, moreover, by love, and hate by dolorous hatred.
Such a man will understand that Empedocles called himself a god because he alone had kept his mind free from evil and unmuddied and by means of the god within him apprehended the god without. Again, when Aratus writes,—
Far as the gleam of the ray from the eye doth reach in its shining,
Full six times such a space would he intercept; of the spaces
Each being equal in measure contains two signs of the star-world,—
it is not the part of the Grammarian to conceive that when the length of the straight line extending from our eye to the sun-rise is taken, six times this length will measure out the circle of the zodiac, so that it cuts off two of its Signs; rather it is the part of the mathematician, who proves by geometry that the sixth part of the circle of the zodiac is formed by the straight line which extends to the sun-rise. Also, when Timon of Phlius compares Pyrrho to the sun, where he says,—
Thou, thou alone, art the guide of mankind, most like to the Sun-god,
Who the whole earth surveys as he revolves in his course,
Showing his globe well-turn’d, as a circle all-fiery and flaming,—
he will seem to the Grammarians to be saying it by way of commendation and on account of the philosopher’s brilliance. But another man will ponder whether the statements made by the man of Phlius about Pyrrho do not conflict with the Sceptics’ doctrine, since the sun exposes things not previously seen by illuminating them with its light, whereas Pyrrho forces the things we have already perceived clearly to revert into obscurity. Yet it is plain to him who considers it more philosophically that this is not the case, but that he is declaring that Pyrrho is suspending judgement like the sun, in so far as that god dims the vision of those who gaze at him intently, and the Sceptics’ argument likewise confuses the eye of the intellect in those who carefully attend to it, so that they fail to apprehend every one of the things postulated by the rash Dogmatists."
II.31f
"Furthermore, [rhetoric] is not useful to cities either. For the laws are what bind cities together, and as the soul perishes when the body has perished, so the cities are destroyed when the laws are abolished. Hence, the theologian Orpheusa hints at their necessity when he says,—
There was a time when every man liv’d by devouring his fellow
Cannibal-wise, and the stronger man did feast on the weaker,
(for when no law was in control each man maintained his right by force of hand, even as it is permitted to
Fishes and beasts of the wild and the winged ravens and vultures,
Each to devour the other, for justice exists not among them),
until God in his pity for their misery sent to them law-bearing goddesses, and men admired these for the way they stopped the lawless cannibalism more than for the way they civilized life by means of the fruits of the earth."
III.40-42
"In general, also, everything conceived is conceived in two main ways, either by way of clear impression or by way of transference from things clear, and this way is threefold,—by similarity, or by composition, or by analogy. Thus, by clear impression are conceived the white, the black, the sweet and the bitter, and by transference from things clear are concepts due to similarity,—such as Socrates himself from a likeness of Socrates, and those due to composition,—such as the hippocentaur from horse and man, for by mixing the limbs of horse and man we have imagined the hippocentaur which is neither man nor horse but a compound of both. And a thing is conceived by way of analogy also in two ways, sometimes by way of increase, sometimes by decrease; for instance, from ordinary men—
Such mortals as now we see—
we conceive by way of increase the Cyclops who was
Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the mountains;
and by way of decrease we conceive the pygmy whom we have not perceived through sense-impressions."
IV.2f
"Now, speaking generally, the mathematical Pythagoreans ascribe great power to numbers, as though the nature of all things was governed in conformity with them. Hence, they constantly kept repeating—
All things, too, are like unto number.
And they swear not only by number but also by Pythagoras, the man who showed it to them, as though he were a god because of the power of arithmetic, saying,—
Nay, by the man I swear who bequeathed to our soul the Tetraktys,
Fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.
And “tetraktys” was the name given by them to the number ten, it being composed of the first four numbers. For one and two and three and four make up ten; and this is the most perfect number, since, when we have reached it, we revert again to the one and make our numerations afresh. And they have called it the “fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring” because, according to them, the reason of the structure of all things resides in it, as for instance that of the body and the soul; for it will suffice to mention these by way of example."
V.1f
"The task before us is to inquire concerning astrology or the “Mathematical Art”—not the complete Art as composed of arithmetic and geometry (for we have confuted the professors of these subjects); nor yet that of prediction practised by Eudoxus and Hipparchus and men of their kind, which some also call “astronomy” (for this, like Agriculture and Navigation, consists in the observation of phenomena, from which it is possible to forecast droughts and rainstorms and plagues and earthquakes and other changes in the surrounding vault of a similar character); it is rather the casting of nativities, which the Chaldeans adorn with more high-sounding titles, describing themselves as “mathematicians” and “astrologers,” treating ordinary folk with insolence in various ways, building a great bulwark of superstition against us, and allowing us to do nothing according to right reason."
Book V is a great source for ancient astrology, and for arguments for and against it. I am only giving a selection, of course much of this book is relevant to "religion". Throughout, 'Chaldean' means astrologer, although in some cases the original Babylonian astrologers are meant in particular.
V.4f
"It being previously assumed, then, that things on earth “sympathize” with those in the heavens,a and that the former are always newly affected by the effluences of the latter
(As is the day brought on by the Sire of gods and of mortals,
So are the thoughts of the hearts of us earth-inhabiting creatures),—
on this assumption the Chaldeans, having too curiously gazed up into the surrounding vault, declare that the seven starsc stand in the relation of efficient causes for the bringing about of everything which occurs in life, and that with them the parts of the zodiac co-operate. Now, as we have been informed, they divide the circle of the zodiac into twelve “zodia” (or “Signs”), and each sign into thirty degrees (let this be near enough to their theories, for the present), and each degree into sixty lepta (or “minutes”),—for so they call what is minimal and without parts."
V.27-34
"For by night, they say, the Chaldean sat on a high peak watching the stars, while another man sat beside the woman in labour till she should be delivered, and when she had been delivered he signified the fact immediately to the man on the peak by means of a gong; and he, when he heard it, noted the rising Sign as that of the horoscope. But during the day he studied the horologes (or sun-dials) and the motions of the sun.
So much, then, for the Signs: as to the stars, they say that some of them are “beneficent,” some “maleficent,” and some “common”; thus Jupiter and Venus are beneficent, but Mars and Saturn maleficent, while Mercury is “common” since it is beneficent when with beneficent stars, but maleficent when with maleficent. But others believe that the same stars are at one time beneficent and at another maleficent according to their varying positions; for either by reason of the Sign, or by reason of the configurations of the other stars, the maleficent star is not entirely maleficent, nor is the beneficent entirely beneficent. They suppose, however, that the Sun and the Moon are the principal stars of the seven, and that the other five have less power than these for the issues of the “effects”; and for this reason the Egyptians liken the Sun to the king and the right eye, and the Moon to the queen and the left eye, and the five stars to lictors, and the other fixed stars to the rest of the people. And they say that, of the five, Saturn and Jupiter and Mercury are in accord with and join in aiding the Sun, and that these stars are called “diurnal” because the Sun, with which they co-operate, governs those born by day, <and that Mars and Venus aid the Moon>. They say also that the same stars have increased power owing to their being in their proper “houses” or “elevations” or “boundaries,” or owing to the fact that some are “guarded” by others, or because they “look towards” one another or are in a certain “configuration” one with another, or because they are at the “centres.”a And, according to them, the Lion is the house of the Sun, the Crab of the Moon, Capricorn and Aquarius of Saturn, the Archer and the Fishes of Jupiter, the Ram and the Scorpion of Mars, the Bull and the Scales of Venus, and the Twins and the Virgin of Mercury."
V.92-93
"For if the man who was born in the arrow’s point of the Archer is doomed—according to the astrological theory—to be slain, how is it that all those myriads of barbarians who fought against the Greeks at Marathon were all slain at one time? For the horoscope was not the same for them all. And again, if he who was born in the pitcher of Aquarius is doomed to suffer shipwreck, how is it that the Greeks who were being brought back from Troy were all drowned together round the “Hollows” of Euboea? For that all these men, who differed greatly from one another, could have been born in the pitcher of Aquarius is impossible. Nor yet is it possible to say that because of one man who was, for instance, destined to perish at sea all those in the ship perish along with him; for what reason is there why this man’s destiny overmasters the destinies of them all, rather than that they should all be saved because of one man whose destiny it is to die on dry land?"
VI.17-20
"the verses of Homer were sung to the lyre. So likewise were the songs and choral odes of the tragic poets, preserving a natural relation, such as are those in verses like these—
Mightiest Earth and Aether of Heaven,—
He of mortal men and of gods is the Sire,
She takes to her bosom the drippings of rain,
And she bears as her offspring mortal men,
And food does she bear, herds too of wild-beasts;
Wherefore not without cause Mother of all is she deemèd.
For, in sum, music is not only a sound of rejoicing, but is heard also in sacred hymns and feasts and sacrifices to the gods; and because of this it incites the mind to emulate the good. It is, too, a consolation to those in grief; and for this reason those who are trying to lighten the grief of mourners sing for them to the flute.
Such are the arguments in defence of music; but in reply to these it is argued, firstly, that it is not conceded off-hand that some tunes are in their nature stimulating, others repressive. For such a thing is contrary to our belief. For just as a clap of thunder—as the Epicurean fraternity declare—does not betoken the epiphany of a god, though supposed to do so by ignorant and superstitious folk, since a similar clap is produced by other bodies clashing together in the same way, as by a mill-stone revolving or the clapping of hands, so likewise in the case of musical tunes it is not by nature that some are of this kind and others of that kind, but it is we ourselves who suppose them to be such. Thus the same tune serves to excite horses, but not at all to excite men who hear it in a theatre. And even to horses it may prove not exciting but disturbing."
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