Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.
11-12
"The ancients also in planning the order of the Universe laid down place as the first principle of all things, and starting out from it Hesiod proclaimed how—
Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter
Earth broad-bosom’d, unshakable seat of all things for ever—
meaning by “Chaos” the place which serves to contain all things; for if this had not subsisted neither earth nor water nor the rest of the elements, nor the Universe as a whole, could have been constructed. And even if, in imagination, we abolish all things, the place wherein all things were will not be abolished, but remains possessing its three dimensions—length, depth, breadth,—but without solidity; for this is an attribute peculiar to body."
The word translated as "created" is really closer to "was born" and "came into being"."
16-19
"Nor is it granted that there is any body which is naturally light, so that it moves into a separate place of its own, but even that which seems to be such is driven up into certain places by some cause and through compulsion. And further, even if it be granted that a naturally light and a naturally heavy exist, none the less it will again be a matter of doubt into what it moves, whether into some body or into a void or a limit or something else possessed of a distinct nature. “Yes,” (they reply,) “but if the ‘from which’ and the ‘by which’ and the ‘on account of which’ exist, the ‘in which’ will also exist.” Not necessarily, we shall say. For if there is doubt about that “from which” a thing becomes (that is, the passive element), and about the “by which” (namely, the cause), and in general about becoming and perishing, or motion generally, then the “in which” also will necessarily be involved in the same doubt. And that these things are matters of doubt we have shown before in our discussion of agent and patient,b and we shall point it out again when considering becoming and perishing, and also, at an earlier stage, motion. For he who said—
Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter
Earth broad-bosom’d, of all things the seat—
is refuted by himself; for if someone asks him “from what did Chaos come into being?,” he will have no answer. And this, as some say, was the reason why Epicurus took to philosophizing. For when still quite a youth he asked his schoolmaster, who was reading out the line “Verily first created of all was Chaos,” what Chaos was created from, if it was created first. And when he replied that it was not his business, but that of the men called philosophers, to teach things of that sort, “Well then,” said Epicurus, “I must go off to them, if it is they who know the truth of things.”"
30-36
"“Yes,” say the Peripatetic philosophers, “but place is the limit of the containing body.” For since earth is contained in water, and water contained in air, and air in fire, and fire in Heaven,—just as the limit of the vessel is the place of the body in the vessel, so also the limit of water is the place of earth, and the limit of air is the place of water, and the limit of fire will be the place of air, and the limit of Heaven will be the place of fire. When we come to the Heaven itself, however, according to Aristotle, it is not in place but abides within itself and in its own proper selfhood; for since place is the extreme limit of the containing body, and according to this philosopher nothing exists outside Heaven so that its limit should be the place of Heaven, it is necessary that Heaven, being contained by nothing, should exist in itself and be contained within its own limits, and not exist in place. Hence Heaven is not existent anywhere; for that which exists anywhere both exists itself and its “where” is other than it, but Heaven has no other thing besides and outside of itself; and on this account, as existing itself within itself, it will not be anywhere.—And so far as regards these statements of the Peripatetics, it seems likely that the First God is the place of all things. For according to Aristotle the First God is the limit of Heaven. Either, then, God is something other than the Heaven’s limit, or God is just that limit. And if He is other than Heaven’s limit, something else will exist outside Heaven, and its limit will be the place of Heaven, and thus the Aristotelians will be granting that Heaven is contained in place; but this they will not tolerate, as they are opposed to both these notions,—both that anything exists outside of Heaven and that Heaven is contained in place. And if God is identical with Heaven’s limit, since Heaven’s limit is the place of all things within Heaven, God—according to Aristotle—will be the place of all things; and this, too, is itself a thing contrary to sense.—Also, in general, if the limit of the enclosing body is the place of the enclosed, this limit is either a body or incorporeal. And if it is a body, since every body must be in a place, place will be in a place and will no longer be place; but if the limit of the containing body is incorporeal, since the limit of every body is a surface, the place of each body will be a surface, which is absurd.—Also, in general, how is it other than ridiculous to say that Heaven is itself its own place? For in this case the same thing will be both the container and the contained, and the same thing both one and two, both body and incorporeal. For in so far as it is the same thing it will be one, but in so far as it is both container and contained it will be two; and in so far as it is contained it will be body, but in so far as it is container, incorporeal; for it is place. But the same thing cannot be conceived as at once both one and two, both body and incorporeal; so then, neither with this conception of it does the apprehension of place have an easy course."
261-267
"Pythagoras... declared that the One is the principle of existing things, by participation in which each of the existing things is termed one; and this when conceived in its self-identity is conceived as One, but when, in its otherness, it is added to itself it creates the “Indefinite Dyad,” so-called because it is not itself any one of the numbered and definite dyads but they all are conceived as dyads through their participation in it, even as they try to prove in the case of the monad. There are, then, two principles of existing things, the First One, by participation in which all the numbered ones are conceived as ones, and also the Indefinite Dyad, by participation in which the definite dyads are dyads.
And that these are in very truth the principles of all things the Pythagoreans teach in a variety of ways. Of existing things some, they say, are conceived absolutely, some by way of contrariety, some relatively. Absolute, then, are those which subsist of themselves and in complete independence, such as man, horse, plant, earth, water, air, fire; for each of these is regarded absolutely and not in respect of its relation to something else. And contraries are all those which are regarded in respect of their contrariety one to another, such as good and evil, just and unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, holy and unholy, pious and impious, in motion and at rest, and all other things similar to these. And relatives are the things conceived as standing in a relation to something else, such as right and left, above and below, double and half; for right is conceived as standing in relation to left, and left also as standing in relation to right, and below as related to above, and above as related to below; and similarly in the other cases.—And they say that things conceived as contraries differ from relatives. For in the case of contraries the destruction of the one is the generation of the other, as in the case of health and disease, of motion and rest; for the generation of disease is the removal of health and the generation of health is the removal of disease, and the existence of motion is the destruction of rest and the generation of rest the removal of motion. And the same account holds good also in the case of pain and painlessness, of good and evil, and in general of all things that are of opposite natures. But relatives have the property both of co-existence and of co-destruction one with the other; for there is no right unless a left also exists, nor a double unless the half also, whereof it is the double, pre-exists."
310-318
"Chapter V.—Concerning Becoming and Perishing
The inquiry concerning becoming and perishing, as undertaken by the Sceptics against the Physicists, is practically concerned with the Whole of things, seeing that of those who have investigated the structure of the Universe some have generated all things from one, others from several thingsa; and of those who have generated them from one, some have done so from an unqualified and others from a qualified thing; and of those who have done so from a qualified thing, some make this air, others water, others fire, others earth; and of those who have generated all from several things, some have done so from numerable things, others from things infinite in number; and of those who adopt numerables, some make them two, others four, others five, others six; and of those who adopt things infinite in number, some make these like to the things generated, others unlike; and some of these last make them impassive, others passive things. Thus the Stoics supposed the becoming of all things to be derived from one unqualified body; for the principle of existing things, according to them, is the unqualified and wholly convertible matter, and by its changes the four elements come into being,—fire and air, water and earth. But Hippasus and Anaximenes and Thales hold that all things have become from one thing which is qualified; and of these Hippasus—and, according to some, Heracleitus of Ephesus—derived the becoming from fire, but Anaximenes from air, and Thales from water, and Xenophanes (according to some) from earth,—
All things spring from the earth, and all in the earth have their ending.
And of those who derive all from things several and numerable, the poet Homer makes them two, earth and water, as he says in one place—
Ocean, sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother that bare them;
and again,
Nay, but I would that ye all might be turnèd to earth and to water.
And with him Xenophanes of Colophon is thought by some to agree; for he says—
All we men from earth and from water have our beginning.
And Euripides <derives all things> from earth and aether, as one may gather from his saying—
Aether I hymn and Earth, the goddess-mother of all things.
And Empedocles from four things—
Four are the roots of all things, and list thou first to their titles:—
Shining Zeus, and Herê the life-bringer, and Aïdoneus,
Nestis too, who wetteth with tears the fountain of mortals.
And from five things Ocellus the Lucanian and Aristotle; for along with the four elements they also adopted the fifth body which revolves in a circle,d and from which they say that the celestial objects are derived. And Empedocles assumed that the generation of all things is from the six. For in the verses where he speaks of “the four roots” of all things he makes their generation to be from four; but when he addse—
Strife pernicious, divided from these and evenly balanc’d,
Love, together with these, in length and breadth perfectly equal,—
he is handing down six as the principles of existing things, four material (earth, water, air, fire), and two efficient (Love and Strife). But Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Democritus and Epicurus and a host of others held that the generation of things is from innumerables; yet whereas Anaxagoras said that these are like to the things generated, Democritus and Epicurus said that they are unlike and impassive (namely, the atoms), while Heracleides of Pontus and Asclepiades said that they are unlike but passive (namely, the irregular molecules)."
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