How Identifications Constitute Difference: Macrobius on the Goddess Maia

It’s often said that Greco-Roman polytheism was additive. This is generally correct, but we cannot take this as if polytheism was a cosmology into which more and more gods could be put. Instead, we also have to think of other aspects as open to addition. In particular, there was an openness to more and more explanations of the same facts, not necessarily in the sense that two explanations were collectively more correct than a single one could be, but certainly in that a person who could refer to many opinions was thought to be more educated. Judgement between alternatives was seen as a sign of erudition as well, but in many circumstances, it was more important to show that one could judge well rather than that one could judge correctly.

This additive approach, which could flesh out the picture especially of such deities as had little definite character, is wonderfully demonstrated in a passage of Macrobius’ magnum opus, the Saturnalia. In a discussion of the twelve months and their names, he derives the name of May (Maius in Latin) from the goddess Maia, and then proceeds to go through a legion of propositions about who she is. In one sense, this is the inverse of the process by which already prominent deities collect the names of minor ones as additional titles: in that case, the question is “under how many names is this great god worshipped?”, in the former, “who is really meant by this obscure name?”. But the effect is not so different, as both minor and major gods become unique nexuses of identifications.

Something that distinguishes Roman religion, at least in the period for which we have records, from that of the Greeks is that questions of mutual identity among the local gods (and not just between native and foreign gods) are central from the very beginning. The contrast should not be overstated—Ares and Enyalios or Apollon and Paion, for example, had an unclear relation of maybe-identity-maybe-not from very early on. But if one can trust the testimony of Macrobius, the rituals contained in the pontifical books (admittedly a vague reference, from which no certain date can be extrapolated) already called on Maia, Bona Dea, Fauna, Ops, and Fatua as one. The large number of Roman gods, many with only a very vaguely defined nature or with an extremely specific domain, both encouraged priests and other thinkers to look for underlying structures, but also meant that many different equally convincing structures could be arrived at. But we should probably imagine that many gods were ambiguously maybe-identical-maybe-not with others from the very beginning, and not just secondarily as a result of speculation; or conversely, we might say that speculation is inherent in ritual formation, but that this kind of implicit theory is in need of and generates further theorizing. If speculation is inherent in the ritual texts and practices, it is also a fundamental part of reading and learning them. Roman pontifical learning, in other words, is not just reproduced or transmitted, but in a constant state of being revised and expanded upon. Yet this revision does not (exclusively) take the form of reformation, where one thing is replaced by another, but a kind of stability through seemingly chaotic pluralism.

But to return to Macrobius: he first (1.12.18) gives the opinion of Cingius, that the Maia after whom the month was named is the wife of Vulcan; and against this that of Piso, that Vulcan’s wife is named Maiesta. An alternative explanation (1.12.19) is that the Maia in question is the mother of Mercury; the association is no doubt derived from the Greeks, as Maia is the mother of Hermes. But the common worship of Maia and Mercury was widely popular among Romans. (In fact, there once was a small temple of the two in my hometown, Regensburg in Bavaria, set up by Roman merchants.)

A more speculative interpretation (1.12.20) is that of Cornelius Labeo, who bypasses the relative identifications (Maia wife of Vulcan or Maia mother of Mercury) and instead takes Maia to be a title of the Earth, meaning “the Greater”, and compares this to Mater Magna “Great Mother”, which is in his view also a name of the Earth. This is in line with his general tendency to take divine names as epithets of planets (the earth counting as a kind of honorary celestial body, but not as a planet in antiquity).

Labeo also uses the circumstantial evidence of the rite from the pontifical rites already mentioned (1.12.21), although the Earth is not explicitly addressed in that ritual, because he also takes all the other goddesses to be epithets of her (1.12.22).

Other alternatives, advanced on single argument each, are the Roman Juno and Proserpine; and, with no supporting evidence at all, the Greek Chthonian Hecate and Semele (1.12.23). But it seems that these are identified not with Maia directly, but with the Bona Dea and indirectly with (the Earth and) Maia (1.12.29). More elaborate is the reasoning for taking her to be the daughter of Faunus (i.e. Fauna, who we have already seen was equated with both Bona Dea and Maia in one ritual), which rests on a mythological explanation of the “divine law” in Bona Dea’s temple (1.12.24–25). Circular proof of this is derived from the fact that Bona Dea is is called theos gunaikeia, ‘women’s goddess,’ in Greek, and that Varro says that she is the daughter of Faunus (1.12.27). (Surely Varro says this about the Greek goddess because he identifies her with Bona Dea, and not the other way around?) Another explanation from features of this temple is that she is Medea (1.12.26).

In sum, we have two Maias, we might say one Greek and one Roman; and we have two Roman goddesses with whom she is identified directly, namely the Bona Dea and Fauna (as well as Ops, and Fatua who is barely distinct from Fauna in the first place).

Bona Dea is identified with three Roman goddesses, Juno, Proserpine and the daughter of Faunus, with the Greek Chthonian Hecate (perhaps by extension from Proserpine?) and theos gynaikeia (which in fact served as the usual Greek translation for Bona Dea, and I think was actually coined for this purpose), two deified heroines from Greek myth, Semele and Medea.

And finally, both Maia and Bona Dea are anchored, so to speak, in a “visible deity”, the Earth.

These multiple identifications of Maia, rather than explaining her away, make her irreducible to any of the deities she is identified with. Admittedly, the discussion of Bona Dea almost takes over the account about her, but inevitably some “knots” in the net of identifications must cluster closer together than others. Although we can attempt something of a chronology—for example, the Earth only comes in with Cornelius Labeo, in the 3^rd (2^nd?) century CE—, I think that we must not write that by assuming that there are original unique identities that then become confused. Even if Maia the wife of Vulcan was worshipped before the borrowing of the Greek Maia and the identification with Bona Dea, this does not mean that she was not identified with other deities at that time. What, for example, are we to make of her doublet, Maiestas? And if we wanted to say that Fauna and Bona Dea are one, then why are there two names in the first place, and why does Macrobius feel he has to justify the identification? To say that the Romans were more confused about their religion than we are is hardly reasonable. Instead, we should think of the conception of each god as always having internal tensions and external resonances. Only this, I think, explains the constant concern with differentiating and identifying them, and only that continual negotiation maintains the intelligibility of the gods.

Simplicius on De caelo #1: On Book 1, chapter 1

Excerpted from R.J. Hankinson, Simplicius: On Aristotle's 'On the Heavens 1.1-4'.

From the Prologue.

"Alexander says that the subject of Aristotle's treatise On the Heavens is the world. He says that 'heaven' [ouranos] is used in three senses by Aristotle in this work, to mean both the sphere of the fixed stars and the whole of the divine revolving body, which in this book he also calls the 'furthest heaven' (with the adjective), and additionally 'the world', as Plato called it when he said 'the whole heaven, or the world or whatever else it might care to be called'. And he adduces Theophrastus as witness, since he talks in his On the Heavens not only of the divine body but also about things which come to be and about their principles. Thus Alexander says [the treatise] is about the world and the five bodies in it, that of the heaven and the four of the sublunary world, fire, air, water, earth.

...

The divine Iamblichus, on the other hand, says that, having set up the heavenly and divine body as the subject of this work, Aristotle in fact includes the study of the whole world, since it is substantially contained in it and under its control in regard to the production of generation; although it is also concerned with the elements and the powers that inhere in them, since all of these things depend upon the heaven and the things which revolve with it.

The great Syrianus and his followers say that the treatise concenrs the heaven proper, i.e. the eternal, revolving body, relying, it seems, on the title, and not accepting Alexander's claim.

...

[V]ery little is said about the world as a whole [in this work], and only such things as it has in common with the heaven, i.e. that it is eternal, limited in size, and single, and that it has these features because the heaven is eternal, limited and single. But if anyone wishes to inspect Aristotle's theory of the world, it must be said that he presents his account of the world in all of his physiccal treatises taken together.

...

[I]t seems to me clearly to be the case that in these books Aristotle treats of both the heavens and the sublunary four elements. [...] Of these the first is the heavenly body, which gives its title to the treatise as being more worthy of honour[.]"

Simplicius on Physics #12: On Book 6

Excerpt from David Konstan's translation of On Aristotle Physics 6.

On 241a26-b12:

"[W]hat is unable to come to be [can not] be coming to be. For it would be coming to be in vain, unless it wer eable to come to be. But neither god nor nature does anything in vain [cf. de Caelo 271a33]. Perhaps Aristotle says more exactly taht what cannot come to be is not coming to be at all. For even if those [legendary giants Otus and Ephialtes] put [Mt.] Ossa on top of [Mt.] Olympus and [Mt.] Pelion on top of [Mt.] Ossa, this was not the coming-to-be of an ascent to heaven, since it was not possible for that to come to be."

Sextus on Religion #5e: Against the Physicists, book 2

Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.

11-12

"The ancients also in planning the order of the Universe laid down place as the first principle of all things, and starting out from it Hesiod proclaimed how—

Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter
Earth broad-bosom’d, unshakable seat of all things for ever—

meaning by “Chaos” the place which serves to contain all things; for if this had not subsisted neither earth nor water nor the rest of the elements, nor the Universe as a whole, could have been constructed. And even if, in imagination, we abolish all things, the place wherein all things were will not be abolished, but remains possessing its three dimensions—length, depth, breadth,—but without solidity; for this is an attribute peculiar to body."

The word translated as "created" is really closer to "was born" and "came into being"."

Simplicius(?) on De anima #2: On Book 3, chapters 1-5

Excerpts from H.J. Blumenthal's 2000 translation. Page numbers of the translation.

p. 22

"On what basis then does he argue that there is no other sense besides the five? The belief in this does not come from induction: there are more unapparent types of living beings than ones we can clearly see. Some are also mortal, the others are those that are superhuman. Nor can it be argued from the elements, on the basis of each of them coming under its own sense, they being four, as well as the exhalation of which smell is said to be the sense, as sight is of fire, hearing of air and the other senses of the others, smell of water and touch of earth. For fire is cognized not only by sight but also by touch, as being hot. So it is unclear whether it has some other quality which we do not know about because we lack a sense which perceives it. How then does Aristotle make us believe that there are only five senses? From the perfection of the life in us and the fact that our sense-organs are not insufficient. Any sense would be insufficient either because the life is dim and is as if one had fainted, being too weak to act in respect of all of them, or because of the insufficiency of the instruments, which are the sense-organs. If therefore the life is perfect and none of the sense-organs is missing, it is reasonable and even necessary that such living beings have all the senses."

Simplicius on Physics #8: On Book 4, chapters 6-9

Excerpts from Paul Lettinck & J.O. Urmson, Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 5-8 with Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Void, 1994. Page numbering according to the translation.

p. 174-176

"He confirms the antiquity of this argument that introduces the void on the basis of motionk from Melissus’ treatment of the consequent as an obvious one, saying that, if what is moves, it moves through a void, and adding ‘but, however, there is no void’, and concluding that ‘therefore what is does not move’. It is clear that Melissus thus in a way relies on the argument. But he relies on it not with regard to the bodily or the partial, but to the intelligible and perfect. For he claims that this is one and unchangingk, proving, I think, its unchangingnessk through it being all and there being nothing beyond it, whither it will be transferred through the void. For THERE there is no void, nor, perhaps, even diversity, since it is everything. Also what is not will have no place in what is wholly real (to pantelôs on). And, even if there is diversity (heterotês) THERE, by which the forms are distinguished from each other, still diversity is a reality. The void has no place in that which wholly is, as does that which is not. ‘But do you guard your thought from this way of enquiry’ as the great Parmenides says.

Using the doctrine (endoxon) of the Pythagoreans, he adds their opinion as a fifth argument for the existence of the void. For these said that the void entered the cosmos which, as it were, breathed in or inhaled it like a breath from that which surrounded it outside. It fulfilled a need to prevent all bodies from being continuous with each other, as Alexander understands them. But Aristotle did not understand them as referring to bodies, but, he says, it ‘distinguishes different natures, the void being an agent of a certain separation of a series and distinguishing its members’. For the members of a series, with nothing between them, are what the void distinguishes; things separated by other things between them are not separated by the void but by those things. Such a power of the void applied to numbers and appeared first to distinguish their natures. For what else is it that distinguishes the monad from the dyad and this from the triad except the void, since no substance was between them?

But what might be these riddles of the Pythagoreans? Is it that the otherness that distinguishes the forms THERE beyond the bodily cosmos was participated in by the cosmos and so brought about the distinction and separation of the forms in it, there being no void THERE (for the beautiful, for example, is different from the just, not because it is not just, but because everything is in accordance with the beautiful through the union THERE, and because in that which wholly is there is not that which is not). But HERE a separation comes about through the intervention of that which is not. For the monad is not a dyad and the dyad not a monad, and the non-existent between them is the void which separates the forms in the cosmos, just as the otherness THERE beyond the cosmos does the forms. It is a being itself also and is not called not-being, and, therefore, not void, but is the cause of the void HERE. That is why Plato in the Sophist called it too, in a way, not-being.

These, then, are the arguments of those who said that there was void as set out by Aristotle. But Strato of Lampsacus reduced the four to two, that from changek of place and that from the compression of bodies, but adds a third which is from attraction. For it happens that the iron-stone attracts other iron things through yet others, when the stone draws out the contents of the pores of the iron, with which material the iron is also pulled along, and this in turn draws out material from another, and this from another, and thus a chain of pieces of iron hangs from the stone."

p. 180

"It is clear that according to that account of the void which says that that is void in which there is no body perceptible to touch, i.e. heavy or light, then, if there be some interval in which are the heavens, that would be void. For the divine body in circular motion is neither heavy nor light, as was proved in On the Heavens."

Simplicius on Physics #10: Corollary on Time

Excerpts from J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time, 1992.

From pages 88f of the translation = pages 774f of the edition:

"So time is the measure of the flow of being, and by being I mean not only essential nature but also activity. Aristotle saw wonderfully well the nature of time and made it clear, saying that for process ‘and the rest to be in time is that their being is measured by time’ [Physics 221a8]. But just as a process does not take place in indivisible parts (for it is not composed of elementary changes, nor a line of points, but the limits of both a line and a process are indivisible, whereas the portions of them of which they are composed, being continuous, are not indivisible but divisible), so in the same way some elements of time that are bounds, the ‘nows’, are indivisible, but the portions of time are not so. For, since time is continuous, it too has portions that are infinitely divisible. So that, even if process and time be in continuous flux, they are not unreal, but have their being in becoming. But becoming is not simply not-being, but is to exist atdifferent times in different areas of being. For just as eternity is the cause of that which undergoes an intelligible differentiation from its own proper unified being remaining within its own single being, so time is the cause of the dance around the intelligible One by that radiance from the form which has descended from THERE into perception and which holds the continuous dance in order. For just as because of place the portions of separate things do not merge together, so because of time the being of the Trojan war is not confounded with that of the Peloponnesian war, nor in each person the being of the baby with that of the adolescent. It is clear that everywhere time is involved with process and alteration, holding together in becoming those things which have their being therein, which is the same thing as to make that which becomes dance around that which is."

From page 103 of the translation = pages 784f of the edition:

"If I am right about this, this primary time is related to the soul as unparticipated eternity is to life. For neither is life eternal (for the eternal is that which is measured by eternity), though it has the same nature as the eternal, viewed from a different perspective, nor is the soul in time but is its own time. The only difference is that soul exists as life-creating, but time as the measurement of the duration of being, unless, indeed, procession has divided their natures, so that soul is one thing, time another. For THERE also there must be this threefold intermediacy, in one way viewed as life, in another as eternity and in another as wholeness; but these are not divided in themselves, though we make divisions in their unified totality. It is clear that this must be the time that is honoured as a god by the Chaldeans and other holy religion (hieras hagisteias, 'sacred ritual'), but it is not this that natural scientists study but that which is viewed in participation. So that must be enough on this topic."

Pages 116f of the translation = page 795 of the edition:

"But Proclus, the Lycian philosopher and the guide of our teachers, also holds roughly the same philosophical view about the separated time (chronos) as Iamblichus, and strives to demonstrate that it is not only intellect but also a god, so that it has even been called on to appear by the theurgists (tôn theourgôn). He says that this time has its internal activities unchangeable, whereas those reaching beyond it are in change. However, concerning the participated time that is inseparable from becoming he maintains the same view as Aristotle, believing that Aristotle says that time exists only in the now. Proclus’ successors right up to our time have followed him not only on this point but in all other matters. I except Asclepiodotus, the best of Proclus’ pupils, and our Damascius, of whom the former, because of his extreme cleverness, rejoiced in novel doctrines, while Damascius, through rivalry and his sympathy with Iamblichus, did not hesitate to reject many of Proclus’ doctrines. With regard to the opinions of these two philosophers, suffice it for me to say that if those who have sought the cause of time among intellects and gods have said that it, too, is an intellect and unchanging and a god, we must accept it. For if anyone seeks the first causes of process and coming to be he will most certainly find them to be intellect and god. There is nothing surprising if they should call time itself by the same names, since this has often seemed good to theologians [or: mythological poets], and perhaps also to the gods themselves. But if anyone is enquiring into the generally recognised time which is present in process, I do not think it possible to call it unchanging or existing as a simultaneous whole or intellect just as it is not possible to think of process as unchanging or existing as a simultaneous whole."

The reference to theurgists here and Chaldaeans in the previous excerpt is probably to the Julians (Julian the Chaldaean and Julian the theurgist), who coined the word 'theurgy'.

Simplicius on Physics #7: Corollary on Place

Excerpt from J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time, 1992.

From page 76 of the translation = page 642 of the edition:

"Perhaps this has already been said. But now it should be added to the above that there is a common conception of the whole of place which says that it is the determination of the position of each distinct thing among entities. The distinction is in relation either to the receptacle or to the container or to the ordering of the position of each in relation to the rest. All these are observable in both incorporeal and corporeal things. For the intelligible orderings were allotted to the different receptacles of the intelligible universe as different places. At any rate Orpheus says about him who regulates the differences of dwelling-places:

Seizing such a measure, he divided out the universe to gods and men.

And THERE the container (periochê) is often called place. That is why the Syrian Atargate is called the place (topos) of the gods, and Isis similarly called by the Egyptians, since they include in themselves the characteristics of many gods [διὸ καὶ τὴν Συρίαν Ἀταργάτην τόπον θεῶν καλοῦσιν καὶ τὴν Ἶσιν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι, ὡς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας περιεχούσας].

Plato calls that place in which the order of the intelligible forms is determined and distinguished in accordance with the order of the position of each towards the rest supramundane and intelligible. With the same signification we say that each number is allotted its proper place when the unit is first, the dyad second, and next the triad, and, as was previously said, the square numbers have their areas and others have others in due order. Also the soul is called the place of forms in accordance with this form of containment. Again, the special types of argument in dialectical proofs are called topics, such as that from opposites and those from similars and those from genera and species."

Simplicius on Physics #13: On Book 7

From p. 84 of the translation by Charles Hagen:

Aristotle "states [sc. in 249b23] that substance is number, either following the Pythagoreans, who claim that numbers are principles of existing things:

Hear, glorious number, father of the blessed ones, father of men,

and:

And all things resemble number,

or because the comings to be and constitutings of absolutely all things are accomplished in accordance with certain definite numbers of elements and parts. This is why none of the human [anthrôpinos] crafts, which imitate universal creation, is able to exist apart from number."

The first line quoted is from the so-called Hymn to Number, also quoted by Asclepius on the metaphysics, and by Simplicius elsewhere. "Father of the blessed ones (=gods)" and humans is a traditional epithet of Zeus, of course.

For the second line, the notes to the Hagen translation cite over ten other citations in ancient texts.

Simplicius on Physics #11: On Book 5

From p. 111 of J. O. Urmson's translation of Simplicius On Aristotle On Physics 5:

“[F]orced ceasing to be is contrary to natural ceasing to be. but in the case of ceasing to be, force is clear; but also there are cases of coming to be which are forced and do not occur according to the laws of nature, which he called ‘not fated’, when some things give birth before a ripe age. The commentators take this as a sign that the Peripatetics assign the fated to the natural, since he called changes that were forced and unnatural ‘not fated’. He also says that some cases of growth are unnatural, like the speedy maturing of those on rich foods who might beget also unnaturally and forcibly, and crops that take quickly through heat and grow in the so-called gardens of Adonis before taking root and being planted the soil. And in the case of alteration both the natural and the unnatural are found. For those who recover from sickness in the critical days are altered naturally and securely, those who do not do so unnaturally and insecurely.”

Simplicius(?) on De anima #3: On Book 3, chapters 6-13

Excerpts from the translation by Carlos Steel (2013), with the translation's page numbering.

pp. 131f

"Let us first see what he means by ‘those which can receive forms without matter’ so that we may know from the positive statement what ‘those are which cannot receive without matter’. And to what corresponds the negation oute (nor) added before it at the beginning? For it is not simply added, but it seems to have some meaning. One may explain the whole text rather as follows. If he now seems to call ‘forms’ the animate forms (if at least there might be in the universe some animate form, and not only individuals which are like corpses), and if his argument is about forms capable of perception, he does now apparently not assume simply animate forms, but those that are also capable of perception or even capable of cognition in a superior way. What can receive such forms without matter are the eternal living beings, which in no way have something [sc. matter] that receives [life] adventitiously. Neither Plato nor Aristotle attributed any form of perception to these beings, because, as has been said, they mean by ‘sense-perception’ the passive perception, not the perception that comes wholly from inside according to its proper activity and that is constitutive of the sense-objects and discriminative of them. These [eternal living beings] are then ‘what can receive forms without matter’. And it has been said what kind of forms they can receive, namely cognitive forms, and forms with a superior capacity of knowing, as is the view of these ancient philosophers, and not [a capacity of knowing] through perception. It is, then, also clear what ‘those beings are which cannot receive’ the cognitive ‘forms without matter’, namely the non-eternal living beings. For such living beings always need sense-perception because of what was said before, as they are easily affected, and they need the primary sense-perception, the sense of touch. We must thus construe oute (nor) by taking up again what was said before: ‘without this perception (namely touch) nothing can be an animal’, and having connected also the last oute with this passage we will thus bring in the rest of the text: ‘those which cannot receive forms without matter’. In this way a double explanation is given for the fact that mortal animals must absolutely have the sense of touch. One reason is that the other senses cannot exist without touch; the second reason is that, since they are generally living beings and can only receive their cognitive forms adventitiously – for that is what it means not to be capable of perception without matter –, they must also be perceptive in a passive sense, ‘if nature does nothing in vain’, that is if it will attribute to animals what is proper to them as animals. For what is good is what is able to preserve each thing, as is also Plato’s view in the Republic. What then has not acquired the cause of its preservation according to nature will exist in vain. But nature does nothing in vain. Hence it also assigns to all animals what preserves them according to measures fitting for each. The capacity of perception is what preserves mortal animals, as it becomes the cause for the avoidance of what is alien and the reception of what is proper to them."

Simplicius(?) on De anima #1: On Book 1.1 to Book 2.4

Excerpts from the 1996 translation by J. O. Urmson, with page numbers of the translation.

From the opening

(p. 15)

"The primary and most important object of concern is the truth about things themselves, both about other things and concerning the soul, which is the most relevant of all for us. Second to this is awareness of the opinions of those who have reached the summit of scientific knowledge. That is why I think it necessary to study very carefully Aristotle’s work On the Soul. Indeed, many divine insights about the soul have been handed down by Plato also; but these have been studied and clarified by Plato’s interpreters sufficiently and with unanimity. But, while Aristotle brought the study of the soul to completion, as is the opinion of Iamblichus, that excellent judge of truth, there is much dissension among those who explain his work, not merely about the interpretation of Aristotle’s text, but also greatly about the subject-matter itself.

That is why I myself decided to investigate and write of the consistency of the philosopher both with himself and also with the truth. I shall avoid rejoinders to others, but confirm my views on doubtful matters from the clear opinions and statements of Aristotle. Everywhere I shall strive to the uttermost for the truth about things in accordance with the teaching of Iamblichus in his own writings about the soul. That is my sole concern. And now, under the Guide who is the cause of all souls and all reasoning, let us start upon the projected work."

The study of the soul is partly physical, partly metaphysical

(p. 16)

"[W]hatever is intellective is the province of first philosophy, which is cognisant of the intelligible and of the intellect which contemplates the intelligible – not only transcendent intellect but also that in us. For things THERE are intelligible to intellect in us, and the intellect and the intelligible, being correlatives, are studied by one and the same discipline, as are the sensitive and the sensible. So the study of the soul is neither simply natural nor simply metaphysical, but belongs to both, as was determined by Aristotle[.]"

On the same

(p. 17)

"Or, it may be put in another way, which the text will make clear, when Aristotle also investigates the same matter: summing up, Aristotle, in the passage before us says: ‘So it is clear that we (natural

scientists, obviously) are not to speak of all soul; for not all soul is natural, but some one or more parts of it.’ Since he himself includes the intellect of the soul in his discussions and not only the natural parts, it is clear that the investigation of the soul is not entirely natural. So let that be our conclusion."

Aristotle's De anima is only about the souls of mortals, not the gods

(p. 17)

"But the scope of the investigation seems to include only the soul of mortal animals. For he seems to take no account of the soul of the heavenly beings, except so far as in his strictures on the mathematical demonstrations about it in the Timaeus. Perhaps he was satisfied with the Platonic insights about it as sufficient, merely commenting that one should not rely on what appears from mathematics. Perhaps also he judged that it was fit to refer to the heavenly soul by what was said about the sublimity of our intellect. ‘For’, he says, ‘it is clear that he <Plato> intends the soul of the universe to be such as is the so-called intellect. For it is not like the sensitive or desirous element.’  For the soul of the universe is pure and intellective reason, wholly and throughout unmixed with secondary lives, because it does not itself come to belong to bodies, but they <come to belong> to the

soul, while it remains at rest in itself. Therefore its travel is circular because of its reversion, whole to whole, upon itself. Also he clearly is not concerned with the various destinies of the human soul nor

most of the choices among ways of life, knowing that the account of these matters has been sufficiently worked out by our leader. But he does not take the soul to be inseparable from the body; for he gives the explanation of our not remembering separated life in Book 3, clearly as existing before our arrival into bodies. Studying primarily the soul of mortals alone, he leaves not one of

its powers and character uninvestigated."

Sextus on Religion #3: Against the Logicians

Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.

Book I

47–51

Now many divergent opinions of all sorts are propounded regarding this subject, but for the present it is sufficient for us to say that some have rejected, others retained the criterion. Of those who have retained it the main views are three: some have retained it in rational discourse, some in non-rational self-evident facts, some in both. Moreover, it has been rejected by Xenophanes of Colophon and Xeniades of Corinth and Anacharsis the Scythian and Protagoras and Dionysodorusa; and besides these, by Gorgias of Leontini and Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus “the Eudaemonist” and Monimus the Cynic. [And amongst these are also the Sceptics.] And of these Xenophanes, according to some, took up this position by declaring all things to be non-apprehensible, as in this passage:

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all things,
No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man know it.
Nay, for e’en should he chance to affirm what is really existent,
He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining.

For here he seems to mean by “clear” what is true and known, just as in the saying

By nature simple is the word of truth.

And by “man” he seems to mean “human being,” using the special term instead of the general; for man is a species of human being. The use of this mode of speech is customary also in Hippocrates, as when he says “A woman is not produced right-handed,”—that is to say, “a female is not compounded in the right-hand parts of the womb.” The words “with respect to the gods” are used, by way of example, for “concerning any non-evident object”; and “opining” stands for surmise and opinion. Consequently his statement, when simplified, amounts to this—“Yet the true and known—at least in respect of non-evident things—no human being knows; for even if by chance he should hit upon it, still he knows not that he has hit upon it but imagines and opines.”

Sextus on Religion #1b: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, books 2 & 3

Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.

Sextus uses ho theos ('the god') in three ways:

• "the god who was just mentioned" - usually translated as "the god" by Bury.
• "the gods as a species", i.e. all gods. Often misleadingly translated as "God".
• "the highest (rational) principle", i.e. the Cosmic God of Stoicism, the Demiurge in Middle Platonism, the First Mover of Roman-period Aristotelianism. Also translated as "God" (a less Christianizing translation might be "The God").

The expression is often ambiguous between the second and third sense, or embraces both meanings.

Book II

5

"[W]hen the Stoic criticizes the statement of the Epicurean that “Being is divided,” or that “God does not foreknow events in the Universe,” or that “Pleasure is the Good,” has he apprehended or has he not apprehended? If he has apprehended these dogmas, by asserting their real truth he entirely overthrows the Porch; while if he has not apprehended them, he is unable to say anything against them."

141

"And of arguments which deduce something non-evident, some conduct us through the premisses to the conclusion by way of progression only, others both by way of progression and by way of discovery as well. By progression, for instance, are those which seem to depend on belief and memory, such as the argument “If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich”; for we assent to the conclusion not so much on account of the logical force of the premisses as because of our belief in the statement of the god."

Book III

1-12

"Concerning the logical division of what is called “Philosophy” the foregoing account may suffice by way of outline.

Chapter I.—Of The Physical Division

Pursuing the same method of exposition in our investigation of the Physical division of Philosophy, we shall not refute each of their statements in order, but we shall endeavour to overthrow those of a more general character wherein the rest also are included.

Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles.

Chapter II.—Of Efficient Principles

Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some are material and some efficient, we shall make our argument start with the efficient; for these, as they assert, are superior to the material.

Chapter III.—Concerning God

Since, then, the majority have declared that God is a most efficient Cause, let us begin by inquiring 

about God, first premising that although, following the ordinary view, we affirm undogmatically that Gods exist and reverence Gods and ascribe to them foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the Dogmatists we argue as follows.

Sextus on Religion #1a: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, book 1

Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.

23f

"Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature’s guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically."

31f

"We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought or alternando. For instance, we oppose appearances to appearances when we say “The same tower appears round from a distance, but square from close at hand”; and thoughts to thoughts, when in answer to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the inference that Providence does not exist."

Sextus on Religion #2: Against the Professors

Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.

I.81

Chares "proposes to make [grammar] cover all Greek language and every signification,--a thing which, if one may say so, is not feasible even for gods."

I.85

"That [grammar] should deal with [all forms of speech in the poets] is sheerly impossible, since in the poets there is discourse concerning the gods and concerning virtue and the soul, things wereof the Grammarians have no expert knowledge."

I.92

"... the 'historial' [part of grammatical science] is that wherein they give instruction regarding persons--divine persons (prosôpôn theiôn), for example, and human, and heroic,--or else explain about places, such as mountains or rivers, or record fictions (plasmatôn) or legends (mythôn), or anything else of that description."

I.176f

"There are two distinct kinds of 'hellenism' [Greek style]: one stands apart from our common usage and seems to proceed in accordance with grammatical analogy; the other conforms to the common usage of each of the Greeks and is derived from framing words and from observation in ordinary converse. For example, the man who froms from the nominate Ζεύς (Zeus) the oblique cases Ζεός (Zeos), Ζεΐ (Zei), Ζέα (Zea), frames the declension in accordance with the first kind of 'hellenism,' but he who simply says Ζηνός (Zênos), Ζηνί (Zêni), Ζῆνα (Zêna) frames it in accordance with the second, the one more usual with us."

I.182

"[S]ince some arts--such as statuary and painting--are really arts (technai), but others which are claimed as arts--such as astrology (Chaldaikê) and the art of the haruspex (thytikê)--are not wholly and truly arts, in order that we may learn whether the so-called art of 'hellenism' is merely a profession or a substantial power, it will be necessary for us to possess some criterion by which to test it."

Sextus on Religion #4: Against the Ethicists

Excerpts from the Loeb Classical Library translation by R. G. Bury.

20

"... but as regards the appearance of each of these things we are in the habit of designating it good or evil or indifferent, even as Timon seems to make plain in his “Images,” when he says—

Verily I will relate each fact as to me it appeareth,

Standard exact of truth having in this my speech,

How that the nature of God and of Goodness abideth for ever,

Whence proceedeth for man Life that is equal and just.

So then, the division mentioned above having been laid down in the form described, let us see what view we should take of the terms contained in it, beginning our discussion with the conception <implied by those terms>."

49

"Now that health is a good, and the prime good, has been asserted by not a few of the poets and writers and generally by all ordinary folk. Thus Simonides the lyric poet declares that “Even fair Wisdom lacks grace unless a man possesses august Health.” And Licymnius, after first uttering this prelude—

Mother sublime, with eyes bright-shining,

Lov’d queen of the holy throne of Apollo,

Gently-smiling Lady of Health—

adds this lofty strain—

Where is the joy of wealth or of kindred,

Or of kingly dominion that maketh man god-like?

Nay, parted from thee can no one be blessed."

69-71

"If, then, there exists anything good by nature or anything evil by nature, this thing ought to be common to all men and be good or evil for all. For just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not warm some but chill others,—and like as snow which chills <by nature> does not chill some and warm others, but chills all alike,—so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others. Wherefore also Plato, in establishing that God is good by nature, argued on similar lines. For, he says, as it is the special property of heat to make hot and the property of cold to chill, so also it is the special property of good to do good; but the Good is God; therefore it is the property of God to do good. So that if there exists anything good by nature, this is good in relation to all men, and if there exists anything evil by nature, that is evil in relation to all. But there is nothing good or evil which is common to all, as we shall establish; therefore there does not exist anything good or evil by nature."

192-194

"And [the Stoics'] recommendations concerning cannibalism may serve as an example of their piety (hosiotêtos) towards the departed; for they deem it right to eat not only the dead but even their own flesh, if ever any part of their body should happen to be cut off. This is what is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On Justice:—“And if any part of the limbs be cut off that is good for food, we should neither bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.” And in his book On Duty, when discoursing about the burial of parents, he says expressly: “When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like nails or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow on it no care or attention of that kind. Hence, also, when their flesh is good for food, men shall make use of it, just as also of their own parts,—when, for instance, a foot is cut off it is proper for them to use it, and things like it; but when the flesh is not good, either they shall bury it and lay the mound upon it, or burn it up and scatter the ashes, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”"

199f

"[T]here is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he shall differ from the not wise. And if this is so, neither will wisdom be an art of life, as it has no artistic work peculiar to itself.

But in reply to this they say that although all the works are common to all men, yet they are distinguished by their proceeding either from an artistic or from a non-artistic disposition. For the work of the virtuous man is not that of caring for his parents and generally honouring his parents, but doing this because of wisdom is the act of the virtuous."

250f

"the apprehension of every object, whether sensible or intelligible, comes about either empirically by way of sense-evidence or by way of analogical inference from things which have appeared empirically, this latter being either through resemblance (as when Socrates, not being present, is recognized from the likeness of Socrates), or through composition (as when from a man and a horse we form by compounding them the conception of the non-existent hippocentaur), or by way of analogy (as when from the ordinary man there is conceived by magnification the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the mountains,

and by diminution the pygmy)."

Damascius on Hieratic #8: On Parmenides IV

Here I am translating a very difficult text from the Greek with the help of Joseph Combès' translation into French (a language I don't really know), so use this with great caution!

[Third Hypothesis (Parm. 155e4-157b5]

[Question 2] Secondly, in what way does Parmenides define it as being one and many, but not one and not many, and being part (metechon) of time?

[Response 2] (...) Besides, Parmenides also predicated "to be a participant of time", attributing to the soul an existence (hupostasin) from the sublunar gods, so that(?) it takes the principle of its descents and ascents from there. Indeed, the hieratics (hieratikoi) and theologians (theologoi) recognize that our soul is affected by the same as these gods, since it descends and ascends as it dies and lives again, as it is produced (paragetai) from such gods. (...)

Damascius' Paradoxography

Photius, Bibliotheca 130:

"Read a work by Damascius in four books,

• the first of which, in 352 chapters, is entitled, On Incredible Events;
• the second, in 52 chapters, On Incredible Stories of D[ai]mons;
• the third, in 63 chapters, On Incredible Stories of Souls that have appeared after Death;
• the fourth, in 105 chapters, On Incredible Natures.

They all contain impossible, incredible, and clumsily invented tales of wonderful things, foolish and worthy of the impious and godless Damascius, who, while the light of the true religion spread over the world, remained steeped in the thick darkness of idolatry. The style is concise, clear, and agreeable, which is not usually the case in such stories." (tr. J. H. Freese)

The fragments of the Philosophical History give something of an idea of the kinds of events that were told in this lost work. Texts about "incredible" things, so-called paradoxographies, were an established genre from very early on in Greek literature, but were not usually connected to narratives of "ghosts" or daimons. However, such tales were not a novelty per se, although I don't know of any earlier collections (which of course doesn't mean there weren't any).

Damascius on Hieratic #5: Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles

Excerpts (more or less tenuously related to ritual and "theurgy") from the translation by Sara Ahbel-Rappe. In this case, I did not check Ahbel-Rappe's translation, which contains many errors, against the Greek, so take these excerpts with some caution.

II 23 (Chapter 49 Ahbel-Rappe)

"... if someone wishes to apply a name to that which by nature has no name, or if someone wishes to speak about what is completely ineffable, or to give a sign for what is signless, nothing prevents him from assigning the highest of designations and of intellections to the unique and ineffable principle as if invoking the most sacred symbols, and so to call that principle, 'One,' in accord with the well-known common conception, which holds that the principle of all things is one, but [one should] know in a more accurate way that this name for the transcendent is not suitable, but rather is appropriate for the elder of the two principles [Limit and Unlimited/Infinitude], if indeed it is appropriate for this ..."

II 98 (Chapter 69 Ahbel-Rappe)

"... we have dedicated the most sacred of our thoughts to the intelligible and to the completely Unified which is sewn about the One ..."

II 104-106 (Chapter 70 Ahbel-Rappe)

"... the Oracles also clearly reveal that the intelligible is capable of being known, and do not confine themselves to the statement that the intelligible is both the object and subject of intellectual activity. The philosophers sometimes explain these words differently, saying that the object is prior to intellect, but not as the knowable, but as the desirable, and they say that intellect is filled from this, not with knowledge, but with substance and with the whole and with intelligible perfection. And this is also the view of Iamblichus as well as his followers. But this view is not always consistent, since in other places they leave open the possibility that knowledge is in the intelligible and around the (II 105) intelligible, as Iamblichus agrees in his Chaldean Theology. And the Oracles also testify to this position, in the verses where they address the Theurgist:

There is an intelligible, which you should contemplate with the flower of your mind. For if you incline your mind toward it and contemplate it as something, you will not contemplate that. It is the power of strength, shining from all sides, flashing with the intellectual rays. You should not use force to contemplate that intelligible, but rather the subtle flame of subtle mind that measures all things, except that intelligible. And I ask you to contemplate this not with intensity, but carrying the sacred backward turning eye of your mind extend an empty mind to that intelligible, until you learn the intelligible, since it is fundamentally beyond mind.

These verses clearly concern this intelligible as well as the knowledge that will be capable of knowing it. [...]

(II 106) This is knowledge in the absolute sense, primary and most authoritative, because it most shares the same nature as the knowable, but it is not of the same nature as the intellectual, but knowledge that one can revere as truly intelligible, and as concentrating itself into the undifferentiated nature of the intelligible.

Once you have donned the garb of all-covering strength of the crashing light,
arm intellect and mind with triple pronged strength,
then cast the entire token of the triad into your imagination, nor
wander with distraction into the empyrean channels, but be concentrated 

the oracular god says, nad things like this, concerning this kind of knowledge. Whence one should take care not to circumscribe this knowledge, as if one could apply the notion of formal knowledge to the Unified. For this kind of knowledge is not the kind that circumscribes the intelligible, but is rather circumscribed by it and defined by it, to the extent that it fully offers itself to the vision."

III 140f (Chapter 118 Ahbel-Rappe)

"They [the triad of the One (if that's the best way of putting it)] therefore must no longer be called three when their being three is added to them, since no otherness is manifest in that realm. Yet unless we speak in a human dialect concerning the most divine principles, we are otherwise not able to conceive them or to name them, except as we are compelled to use reason on behalf of the realities that turn out to be beyond every intellect, life, and substance. Indeed, even the gods thus instruct some of us occasionally concerning these and other realities, [though] not in the way that reveals the nature of the realities that the god themselves contemplate. Just as they speak to Egyptians, Syrians, or Greeks using the language appropriate to them, else it would be fruitless to speak to them, so they are eager to transmit to human beings that which belongs [to the divine] and they will use a human dialect, as is right. Yet this dialect is not only composed of verbs and nouns, (III 141) but it is also composed from conceptions that are suitable and adjusted to human beings. If, therefore, we also get off the track of that truth as we attempt to chart the intelligible abyss, to see how great and what its nature is, and we are carried toward the lower and divided realitites, as we are by necessity dragged along with or dragged down by our own meager nothingness, nevertheless it is necessary to endure missing and drifting [from the goal]. Otherwise, it is not possible, in our present state, to have any conception concerning these things, and we must be content even if only with a far-off and obscure glance or glimpse or trace suddenly flashing before our eyes, however small and not very luminous, but nevertheless a signpost for us that is an analogue of that superluminous and vast nautre. But this much we can accept in our discourse, that it castigates itself and agrees that it is not capable of looking at that unified and intelligible light."