Simplicius on Physics #7: Corollary on Place

Excerpt from J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time, 1992.

From page 76 of the translation = page 642 of the edition:

"Perhaps this has already been said. But now it should be added to the above that there is a common conception of the whole of place which says that it is the determination of the position of each distinct thing among entities. The distinction is in relation either to the receptacle or to the container or to the ordering of the position of each in relation to the rest. All these are observable in both incorporeal and corporeal things. For the intelligible orderings were allotted to the different receptacles of the intelligible universe as different places. At any rate Orpheus says about him who regulates the differences of dwelling-places:

Seizing such a measure, he divided out the universe to gods and men.

And THERE the container (periochê) is often called place. That is why the Syrian Atargate is called the place (topos) of the gods, and Isis similarly called by the Egyptians, since they include in themselves the characteristics of many gods [διὸ καὶ τὴν Συρίαν Ἀταργάτην τόπον θεῶν καλοῦσιν καὶ τὴν Ἶσιν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι, ὡς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας περιεχούσας].

Plato calls that place in which the order of the intelligible forms is determined and distinguished in accordance with the order of the position of each towards the rest supramundane and intelligible. With the same signification we say that each number is allotted its proper place when the unit is first, the dyad second, and next the triad, and, as was previously said, the square numbers have their areas and others have others in due order. Also the soul is called the place of forms in accordance with this form of containment. Again, the special types of argument in dialectical proofs are called topics, such as that from opposites and those from similars and those from genera and species."

Simplicius on Physics #13: On Book 7

From p. 84 of the translation by Charles Hagen:

Aristotle "states [sc. in 249b23] that substance is number, either following the Pythagoreans, who claim that numbers are principles of existing things:

Hear, glorious number, father of the blessed ones, father of men,

and:

And all things resemble number,

or because the comings to be and constitutings of absolutely all things are accomplished in accordance with certain definite numbers of elements and parts. This is why none of the human [anthrôpinos] crafts, which imitate universal creation, is able to exist apart from number."

The first line quoted is from the so-called Hymn to Number, also quoted by Asclepius on the metaphysics, and by Simplicius elsewhere. "Father of the blessed ones (=gods)" and humans is a traditional epithet of Zeus, of course.

For the second line, the notes to the Hagen translation cite over ten other citations in ancient texts.

Simplicius on Physics #11: On Book 5

From p. 111 of J. O. Urmson's translation of Simplicius On Aristotle On Physics 5:

“[F]orced ceasing to be is contrary to natural ceasing to be. but in the case of ceasing to be, force is clear; but also there are cases of coming to be which are forced and do not occur according to the laws of nature, which he called ‘not fated’, when some things give birth before a ripe age. The commentators take this as a sign that the Peripatetics assign the fated to the natural, since he called changes that were forced and unnatural ‘not fated’. He also says that some cases of growth are unnatural, like the speedy maturing of those on rich foods who might beget also unnaturally and forcibly, and crops that take quickly through heat and grow in the so-called gardens of Adonis before taking root and being planted the soil. And in the case of alteration both the natural and the unnatural are found. For those who recover from sickness in the critical days are altered naturally and securely, those who do not do so unnaturally and insecurely.”

Simplicius(?) on De anima #3: On Book 3, chapters 6-13

Excerpts from the translation by Carlos Steel (2013), with the translation's page numbering.

pp. 131f

"Let us first see what he means by ‘those which can receive forms without matter’ so that we may know from the positive statement what ‘those are which cannot receive without matter’. And to what corresponds the negation oute (nor) added before it at the beginning? For it is not simply added, but it seems to have some meaning. One may explain the whole text rather as follows. If he now seems to call ‘forms’ the animate forms (if at least there might be in the universe some animate form, and not only individuals which are like corpses), and if his argument is about forms capable of perception, he does now apparently not assume simply animate forms, but those that are also capable of perception or even capable of cognition in a superior way. What can receive such forms without matter are the eternal living beings, which in no way have something [sc. matter] that receives [life] adventitiously. Neither Plato nor Aristotle attributed any form of perception to these beings, because, as has been said, they mean by ‘sense-perception’ the passive perception, not the perception that comes wholly from inside according to its proper activity and that is constitutive of the sense-objects and discriminative of them. These [eternal living beings] are then ‘what can receive forms without matter’. And it has been said what kind of forms they can receive, namely cognitive forms, and forms with a superior capacity of knowing, as is the view of these ancient philosophers, and not [a capacity of knowing] through perception. It is, then, also clear what ‘those beings are which cannot receive’ the cognitive ‘forms without matter’, namely the non-eternal living beings. For such living beings always need sense-perception because of what was said before, as they are easily affected, and they need the primary sense-perception, the sense of touch. We must thus construe oute (nor) by taking up again what was said before: ‘without this perception (namely touch) nothing can be an animal’, and having connected also the last oute with this passage we will thus bring in the rest of the text: ‘those which cannot receive forms without matter’. In this way a double explanation is given for the fact that mortal animals must absolutely have the sense of touch. One reason is that the other senses cannot exist without touch; the second reason is that, since they are generally living beings and can only receive their cognitive forms adventitiously – for that is what it means not to be capable of perception without matter –, they must also be perceptive in a passive sense, ‘if nature does nothing in vain’, that is if it will attribute to animals what is proper to them as animals. For what is good is what is able to preserve each thing, as is also Plato’s view in the Republic. What then has not acquired the cause of its preservation according to nature will exist in vain. But nature does nothing in vain. Hence it also assigns to all animals what preserves them according to measures fitting for each. The capacity of perception is what preserves mortal animals, as it becomes the cause for the avoidance of what is alien and the reception of what is proper to them."

Simplicius(?) on De anima #1: On Book 1.1 to Book 2.4

Excerpts from the 1996 translation by J. O. Urmson, with page numbers of the translation.

From the opening

(p. 15)

"The primary and most important object of concern is the truth about things themselves, both about other things and concerning the soul, which is the most relevant of all for us. Second to this is awareness of the opinions of those who have reached the summit of scientific knowledge. That is why I think it necessary to study very carefully Aristotle’s work On the Soul. Indeed, many divine insights about the soul have been handed down by Plato also; but these have been studied and clarified by Plato’s interpreters sufficiently and with unanimity. But, while Aristotle brought the study of the soul to completion, as is the opinion of Iamblichus, that excellent judge of truth, there is much dissension among those who explain his work, not merely about the interpretation of Aristotle’s text, but also greatly about the subject-matter itself.

That is why I myself decided to investigate and write of the consistency of the philosopher both with himself and also with the truth. I shall avoid rejoinders to others, but confirm my views on doubtful matters from the clear opinions and statements of Aristotle. Everywhere I shall strive to the uttermost for the truth about things in accordance with the teaching of Iamblichus in his own writings about the soul. That is my sole concern. And now, under the Guide who is the cause of all souls and all reasoning, let us start upon the projected work."

The study of the soul is partly physical, partly metaphysical

(p. 16)

"[W]hatever is intellective is the province of first philosophy, which is cognisant of the intelligible and of the intellect which contemplates the intelligible – not only transcendent intellect but also that in us. For things THERE are intelligible to intellect in us, and the intellect and the intelligible, being correlatives, are studied by one and the same discipline, as are the sensitive and the sensible. So the study of the soul is neither simply natural nor simply metaphysical, but belongs to both, as was determined by Aristotle[.]"

On the same

(p. 17)

"Or, it may be put in another way, which the text will make clear, when Aristotle also investigates the same matter: summing up, Aristotle, in the passage before us says: ‘So it is clear that we (natural

scientists, obviously) are not to speak of all soul; for not all soul is natural, but some one or more parts of it.’ Since he himself includes the intellect of the soul in his discussions and not only the natural parts, it is clear that the investigation of the soul is not entirely natural. So let that be our conclusion."

Aristotle's De anima is only about the souls of mortals, not the gods

(p. 17)

"But the scope of the investigation seems to include only the soul of mortal animals. For he seems to take no account of the soul of the heavenly beings, except so far as in his strictures on the mathematical demonstrations about it in the Timaeus. Perhaps he was satisfied with the Platonic insights about it as sufficient, merely commenting that one should not rely on what appears from mathematics. Perhaps also he judged that it was fit to refer to the heavenly soul by what was said about the sublimity of our intellect. ‘For’, he says, ‘it is clear that he <Plato> intends the soul of the universe to be such as is the so-called intellect. For it is not like the sensitive or desirous element.’  For the soul of the universe is pure and intellective reason, wholly and throughout unmixed with secondary lives, because it does not itself come to belong to bodies, but they <come to belong> to the

soul, while it remains at rest in itself. Therefore its travel is circular because of its reversion, whole to whole, upon itself. Also he clearly is not concerned with the various destinies of the human soul nor

most of the choices among ways of life, knowing that the account of these matters has been sufficiently worked out by our leader. But he does not take the soul to be inseparable from the body; for he gives the explanation of our not remembering separated life in Book 3, clearly as existing before our arrival into bodies. Studying primarily the soul of mortals alone, he leaves not one of

its powers and character uninvestigated."

Sextus on Religion #3: Against the Logicians

Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.

Book I

47–51

Now many divergent opinions of all sorts are propounded regarding this subject, but for the present it is sufficient for us to say that some have rejected, others retained the criterion. Of those who have retained it the main views are three: some have retained it in rational discourse, some in non-rational self-evident facts, some in both. Moreover, it has been rejected by Xenophanes of Colophon and Xeniades of Corinth and Anacharsis the Scythian and Protagoras and Dionysodorusa; and besides these, by Gorgias of Leontini and Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus “the Eudaemonist” and Monimus the Cynic. [And amongst these are also the Sceptics.] And of these Xenophanes, according to some, took up this position by declaring all things to be non-apprehensible, as in this passage:

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all things,
No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man know it.
Nay, for e’en should he chance to affirm what is really existent,
He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining.

For here he seems to mean by “clear” what is true and known, just as in the saying

By nature simple is the word of truth.

And by “man” he seems to mean “human being,” using the special term instead of the general; for man is a species of human being. The use of this mode of speech is customary also in Hippocrates, as when he says “A woman is not produced right-handed,”—that is to say, “a female is not compounded in the right-hand parts of the womb.” The words “with respect to the gods” are used, by way of example, for “concerning any non-evident object”; and “opining” stands for surmise and opinion. Consequently his statement, when simplified, amounts to this—“Yet the true and known—at least in respect of non-evident things—no human being knows; for even if by chance he should hit upon it, still he knows not that he has hit upon it but imagines and opines.”

Sextus on Religion #1b: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, books 2 & 3

Excerpts from R. G. Bury's Loeb Classical Library translation.

Sextus uses ho theos ('the god') in three ways:

• "the god who was just mentioned" - usually translated as "the god" by Bury.
• "the gods as a species", i.e. all gods. Often misleadingly translated as "God".
• "the highest (rational) principle", i.e. the Cosmic God of Stoicism, the Demiurge in Middle Platonism, the First Mover of Roman-period Aristotelianism. Also translated as "God" (a less Christianizing translation might be "The God").

The expression is often ambiguous between the second and third sense, or embraces both meanings.

Book II

5

"[W]hen the Stoic criticizes the statement of the Epicurean that “Being is divided,” or that “God does not foreknow events in the Universe,” or that “Pleasure is the Good,” has he apprehended or has he not apprehended? If he has apprehended these dogmas, by asserting their real truth he entirely overthrows the Porch; while if he has not apprehended them, he is unable to say anything against them."

141

"And of arguments which deduce something non-evident, some conduct us through the premisses to the conclusion by way of progression only, others both by way of progression and by way of discovery as well. By progression, for instance, are those which seem to depend on belief and memory, such as the argument “If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich”; for we assent to the conclusion not so much on account of the logical force of the premisses as because of our belief in the statement of the god."

Book III

1-12

"Concerning the logical division of what is called “Philosophy” the foregoing account may suffice by way of outline.

Chapter I.—Of The Physical Division

Pursuing the same method of exposition in our investigation of the Physical division of Philosophy, we shall not refute each of their statements in order, but we shall endeavour to overthrow those of a more general character wherein the rest also are included.

Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles.

Chapter II.—Of Efficient Principles

Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some are material and some efficient, we shall make our argument start with the efficient; for these, as they assert, are superior to the material.

Chapter III.—Concerning God

Since, then, the majority have declared that God is a most efficient Cause, let us begin by inquiring 

about God, first premising that although, following the ordinary view, we affirm undogmatically that Gods exist and reverence Gods and ascribe to them foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the Dogmatists we argue as follows.